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Abstract

Generally speaking, scholarship in the field of Germanistik has taken an interest in
Friedrich Schlegel’s early publication, “Vom aesthetischen Werte der griechischen Komoedie”
(1794), either because of its perceived influence on German Romantic Comedy [(Catholy 1982),
(Kluge 1980), (Holl 1923), (Japp 1999)], or else because of its relevance as an example of
Schlegel's still inchoate aesthetic philosophy [(Dierkes 1980), (Behrens 1984), (Schanze 1966),
(Michel 1982), (Dannenberg 1993), (Mennemeier 1971)]. As a theory of comedy in its own
right, Schlegel’s essay has garnered little attention, in part because of its supposed inapplicability
to comedic praxis and at times utopian implications, in part because of its seemingly
contradictory argument, and lastly in part because Schlegel himself abandoned the essay’s
central premise soon after its publication. However, it is the central argument of the present
study that Schlegel’s essay can be shown to be interesting and relevant precisely for the theory of
comedy it contains. Through a close reading of Schlegel’s essay on Old Greek Comedy, as well
as an examination of Schlegel’s early political and aesthetic beliefs, which will help render
Schlegel’s theory more intelligible, it will be shown that Schlegel’s theory of comedy is novel in
so far as it is one of the first aesthetic theories to claim that comedic practice is necessarily
deprived of aesthetic validity unless it exists in a social atmosphere of freedom of expression,
namely, such as that of the Athenians. The implication is that Schlegel here predicates an
aesthetic theory upon one of society. Schlegel’s theory is also interesting for the peculiar type of
comedy it advocates, namely a joyous comedy (Comedy of ‘Freude’), which stands in direct
opposition to the ‘Satirische Verlachskomoedie’ of the Enlightenment and makes use of a
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comedic mechanism (joy) that is anathema to traditional negative comedic elements (satire,
derision, mockery etc.).

The conclusion discusses what the relevance and value of these

implications might be for future research.
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I

Introduction

In October 1794, Friedrich Schlegel sent his brother, August Wilhelm, a copy of an essay he
had been working on for close to a year under the working title “Apologie des Aristophanes”1. It
was, he wrote, “nur eine Rhapsodie, die künftig einen Teil der Geschichte der Griechischen
Komödie ausmachen wird” (Let. to A.W. 10-27-1794) 2. Nevertheless he conceded to his brother
that he had taken pains to make the essay’s argument cogent and its style clear: “Ich gab mir
Mühe die Sprache leicht, und den Zusammenhang fließend zu machen, das Gehackte zu meiden,
was Du mit Recht immer an mir tadelst” (ibid.). The essay’s publication came a few months
later in the December issue of the Berlinsche Monatschrift under the title Vom ästhetischen
Werte der griechischen Komödie (KAI 19-33). It was Schlegel’s first publication, and it became
one of his most well-known and well-regarded early works3. In part, its fame at the time rested
on the fact that the essay – as its initial title indicates – was seen as a defense of Aristophanes’
worth as a playwright.

In it Schlegel did more than simply defend the famous Greek

playwright’s place in the comedic canon against what he saw as a long and unfair tradition of
dismissal from primarily French criticism. Schlegel champions Aristophanes’ plays as the
1

The earliest mention of the essay is in a letter to his brother dating from December 11, 1793 (Kritische FriedrichSchlegel-Ausgabe XXIII 162). We cannot know for sure how long he had already been working on his essay on
Aristophanes, but in that letter he claims that it and a few others studies, “werden auch wohl zugleich fertig werden”
(Kritische Friedrich-Schlegel-Ausgabe XXIII 164).
2
All the letters by Friedrich Schlegel used in this study are addressed to his brother, August Wilhelm. For brevity’s
sake, citations of these letters will hereafter be followed by a parenthetical citation in the form, (Let. to AW, 4-51794). The reader will find a list of the page numbers as well as the volume in the Kritische Friedrich-SchlegelAusgabe where these letters are to be found in the appendix that follows the present study.
3
In his introduction to volume one of the KA, which includes all of Schlegel’s early works on Classical literature,
Ernst Behler cites the positive reception that Schlegel’s essay found with a number of his contemporaries; among
them Christian Gottfried Körner and Friedrich Creuzer (Behler Einleitung CXLIVf.). Behler, whose immense
scholarship on Friedrich Schlegel helped yield the very helpful Kritische Friedrich-Schlegel-Ausgabe (KA), will be
quoted from liberally in the following study.
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genre’s finest. “Die alte griechische Komödie”, he writes, “ist eins der wichtigsten Dokumente
für die Theorie der komischen Kunst; denn in der ganzen Geschichte der Kunst sind ihre
Schönheiten einzig, und vielleicht deswegen allgemein verkannt” (KAI 20)4. In addition, the
essay attracted attention at the time of its publication and, indeed, has maintained an appeal ever
since because of its surprisingly novel approach to the theory of comedy, eschewing completely
the familiar concepts and schemata of Enlightenment theories of comedy, and choosing instead
to build a theory from an entirely different set of premises, which Schlegel developed from his
understanding of Old Greek Comedy.

The vindication of Aristophanes, which followed

naturally, amounted to a theoretically backed endorsement for a new comedic ideal. In recent
years, a fair amount of scholarship in Romantikforschung has sought to examine the extent to
which this new comedic ideal corresponds with the Romantic plays of Tieck, Brentano, and
Arnim5. It is important to note, however, that Schlegel himself was only secondarily interested
in clearing Aristophanes’ name. Primarily, he was concerned with developing a sound theory of
comedy. In fact, from around 1793 to 1796, Schlegel had been immersed in an ambitious effort
to develop a general theory of literature, which would arrive at the essential elements of the
various traditional literary genres by examining the history of their ‘birth’ and development
under the Greeks, and to a lesser extent, Romans. Though Schlegel never completed this work,
and after 1796 turned his attention increasingly to post-Classical literature (Behler
Selbstzeugnisse 44), the theory of comedy that he developed in his essay on Aristophanes is one

4

Throughout his essay on Aristophanes, Schlegel takes the term ‘Old Greek Comedy’ to be synonymous with the
plays of Aristophanes, since these were the only complete plays known to him to have originated during that period.
5
See, for example, works by Japp (1999), Catholy (1982), Kluge (1980), and Scherer (2003).
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the most realized theories of any genre from this early period of his career, and it has made its
way into the canon of German theories of comedy6.
Inasmuch as Schlegel’s Aristophanes-essay is meant to be a systematic and complete
theory of comedy, it is remarkably short; 20 pages in its original printing. To a large extent,
Schlegel was capable of such brevity because his theory is quite bare; it ascribes to the comedic
ideal only a few essential qualities.
Schlegel’s explanation of what he believes to be the true essence of comedy follows from
three sources:
1. his assumptions about human nature and the human purpose; in other words, his
anthropological beliefs and his Bildungstheorie, respectively;
2. his understanding of the social practice of Greek Comedy; and
3. his interpretation of Aristophanes’ plays themselves.
Schlegel begins his essay on Greek Comedy by positing the concept of Freude both as a
fundamental characteristic of human nature, and also as a positive personal and social value. He
then describes how this value is obtained at the personal level, arguing that individuals realize
their capacity for Freude through wanton and purposeless activity. According to Schlegel,
comedy’s essential characteristic is that it functions as a symbol of Freude, and he sees the
comedic ritual as an act that brings individuals together in a collective celebration of Freude. An
essential prerequisite to the success of this ritual is that the community in which a comedy is
produced and staged guarantee – through religious, political or some other form of protection –
comedy’s complete freedom of expression. Schlegel then shows how Greek Comedy most
6

See for example, Profitlich’s Komödientheorie: Texte und Kommentare vom Barock bis zur Gegenwart (1998),
which dedicates a chapter to Schlegel’s Aristophanes-essay. Also, see Catholy, 184-191, and Kluge, 186-199.
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closely resembled what he sees as the comedic ideal, and further explains what kept Greek
Comedy from fully realizing this ideal. The implication is that since Schlegel’s ideal had not yet
been fully realized, it could only, if ever, be achieved by future generations.
This is an extremely brief summary of Schlegel’s argument, and it will be one of the main
objectives of the present study to explain this theory in more detail. Yet, a few important aspects
are already apparent from the description above.

First and foremost, Schlegel’s theory is

normative and programmatic. He describes an aesthetic ideal, not an interpretive framework for
understanding the mechanisms behind comedy. And more than being an aesthetic ideal against
which existing plays might be judged, Schlegel’s theory of comedy – or more appropriately,
theory of a comedic ideal – concerns itself with understanding the essence of the comedic spirit.
Thus, his theory ill lends itself to the judging of actual comedies. To the extent that a vast
number of comedies make no effort to symbolize Freude, they could not even be classified as
comedies under his framework.
Schlegel’s theory is also peculiar to the extent that it is as much a normative theory of society
as it is of comedy. His argument is explicitly anchored in a moral/anthropological premise. For
him, what comedy should be is inherently linked to what society should be, which in this
context, is itself a function of what is good and fitting for individuals. This normative aspect of
Schlegel’s theory is the central interest of the present study, which intends to outline the sociopolitical implications of Schlegel’s theory of comedy. It will seek to answer from a descriptive
standpoint, what place Schlegel sees comedy as having in society and from a normative
standpoint, what role Schlegel believes comedy should play in society. This requires that I first
arrive at a formal and methodologically sound understanding of Schlegel’s theory of comedy.

5
Doing so will allow me to uncover the socio-politically predicated components of Schlegel’s
theory. In the end, I hope to show that Schlegel’s theory of comedy is implicitly political, since
it defends and requires a limited form of freedom of expression, and that furthermore, parts of
Schlegel’s theory imply a democratic state structure – in the Athenian sense – as an aesthetic
necessity.
It must be stated at the outset that this study does not attempt to arrive at a comprehensive
understanding of Friedrich Schlegel’s views on comedy; that is to say, it does not attempt to
explore Schlegel’s general attitude towards comedy throughout his life. Rather, this study seeks
to best understand the theory of comedy laid down in Schlegel’s essay on Aristophanes. To the
extent that there are ambiguities in that essay, recourse will be made to Schlegel’s
contemporaneous letters and publications. Thus what is sometimes termed the post-Fichtean
Schlegel is of no real interest here.
After giving a brief publication history of the Aristophanes-essay and an overview of the
current body of relevant research, which is the aim of Chapter II, I will address in Chapter III,
three prerequisites for a proper understanding of Schlegel’s theory, each in individual
subchapters. Subchapter III.1 concerns itself with certain assumptions of German aesthetic
philosophy in the 1790s which Schlegel takes as given. A modern understanding of Schlegel’s
own theory of comedy is only possible if one considers it within the context of the language of
German aesthetic philosophy in the 1790s7. Schlegel’s theory operates primarily by bringing a

7

In proposing this, I choose a methodological approach not unlike Gadamer’s in Truth and Method, who claims that
in order to properly examine the issue of the humanistic tradition in the late 18th century, and more specifically for
him, the hermeneutic tradition, one is well-served to historicize key aesthetic terms which we might at first take as
self-evident: “Key concepts and words which we still use acquired their special stamp then [i.e. during the Age of
Goethe], and if we are not to be swept along by language, but to strive for a reasoned historical self-understanding,
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few key concepts into play with one another and as such, eludes easy comprehension, because it
assumes a contemporary understanding of the terminology used. Abstract terms like Freiheit,
Schönheit and Freude are made liberal use of and are central to the theoretical framework of his
argument. It is important to remember that they also have historically bound meanings, and we
will be led astray if we approach this text without taking the trouble to define them in their
historical context. It is well known, for instance, that the notion of Freiheit played a ubiquitous
role in the social and political rhetoric of the Enlightenment8 and later became a central
theoretical component of German writings on literary aesthetics in the wake Kant’s publication
of the Kritik der Urteilskraft (1790). Martin Holtermann, in his discussion of the German
reception of Aristophanes in the 1790s makes the apt point that the notion of freedom plays a
central role not only in Schlegel’s theory of comedy, but also in many of his contemporaries’
theories of comedy as well9.
Subchapter III.2 addresses the programmatic component of Schlegel’s essay on
Aristophanes. Schlegel’s effort to understand comedy is, in part, motivated by a desire to rectify
we must face a whole host of questions about verbal and conceptual history. In what follows it is possible to do no
more than begin the great task that faces investigators, as an aid to our philosophical inquiry. Concepts such as ‘art’,
‘history’, ‘genius’[…] which we take to be self-evident, contain a wealth of history” (Gadamer 9). Furthermore,
Schlegel’s aesthetic philosophy during this time, it has been often claimed, is best understood as a sub-movement of
German Idealism or – as it has sometimes been termed –Transcendental Philosophy. For example, Ernst Behler
writes: “Friedrich Schlegel [war sich] darüber im klaren, daß seine Sehweise oder Darstellung der griechischen
Bildung eine auf der Transzendentalphilosophie beruhende ‘Geschichte des Bewußtseins’ war, ‘die [er] da und nicht
in der künstlichen Methode suchte’” (Behler Einleitung LXXVII). [Behler quotes from Schlegel (KAXV Studien
des Altertums, Nr. 2)]. Thus it will be necessary in what follows to base definitions of aesthetic terms not only on
the Aristotles-derived poetic systems of the Baroque and early Enlightenment but also on German philosophy of the
late 18th century, which took, as it did, a great interest in matters of art.
8
Peter Gay expresses what has become a truism of our understanding of the Enlightenment when he writes that
“freedom” is the unifying theme of the Enlightenment program: “The men of the Enlightenment were united on a
vastly ambitious program […] of […] above all, freedom in its many forms” (Gay 3).
9
Holtermann (pg. 96) cites others who have remarked on the centrality of freedom in theories of comedy during the
1790’s; for example Beare’s Theorie der Komödie (1927): “Diese Freiheitsforderung ist überall in der Theorie der
Zeit zu spüren” (Beare 67), and Walzel’s “Aristophanische Komödien”: “Das Schlagwort Freiheit beherrscht
ebenso Schillers wie Friedrich Schlegels Gedanken über die Komödie” (Walzel 491).
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what he sees as the inadequacies of some of the most prevalent tendencies in 18th century
theories of comedy. His essay constitutes an implied attack on those who he believes had
misunderstood comedy’s essence and had, as a consequence, dismissed Aristophanes’ worth. In
addition, his proclamation of a new comedic ideal is meant to demonstrate the inadequacies of
prevalent comedic genres in the mid to late 18th century, like the comédie larmoyante, the
Familiengemälde and similar emerging bourgeois comedic styles.
Subchapter III.3 gives a brief overview of Schlegel’s general early project of developing
a historically based literary aesthetic system from the corpus of Classical literature.

As I

mentioned above, Schlegel intended to eventually supplement his theory of comedy with theories
of all the various Classical genres. In fact, everything that he wrote during his study of Classical
literature was done so with one eye toward this ultimate goal. Thus, a sound understanding of
his theory of comedy necessitates that one understand the contours of his general attitude toward
Classical literature and his general aesthetical-historical approach to literary theory during this
period. Most importantly, Schlegel’s theory of comedy only makes sense if one is acquainted
with his understanding of Greek tragedy. For example, one explanation that he gives, in the
Aristophanes-essay for “die Natur des Komischen” is that it is, per definition, devoid of
“tragische Energie” (KAI 20). Schlegel sees the ideal comical and the ideal tragical as absolute
opposites, and periodically in this study, explanations of his theory of comedy will follow from
explanations of his beliefs about tragedy. Since Schlegel wrote extensively on Greek tragedy
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elsewhere in his early writings, I will make use of these other writings to help clarify the
tragedy/comedy dichotomy as he understood it10.
Following Chapter III, I turn in Chapter IV to a close reading of the Aristophanes-essay
itself, with the goal of presenting a faithful and logical formulation of Schlegel’s theory. I hope
to show what Schlegel believes the comedic ideal means for the individual, what it means for the
form that a given comedy should take, and what it means for society at large. Chapter V is an
excursus into Schlegel’s early political thought, which will allow me to return to the question of
the extent to which his theory is predicated on certain political structures and socio-political
rights. The conclusion (Chapter VI) addresses the question of what contemporary scholarship
might stand to gain from Schlegel’s theory of comedy and what his theory’s applicability, if any,
might be in a modern context.

10

It is necessary here to list the main texts by Schlegel that will be used in the following study. Of course the
central text for this study is his Vom ästhetischen Werte der Griechischen Komödie (1794) (KAI 19-33). Excerpts
from this text constitute the vast majority of the citations from Schlegel that are found in this study. However, in the
construction of my argument, I have found it necessary to supplement Schlegel’s thoughts in that essay with others
that can be found, for the most part, in his writings (both published and unpublished) and letters from the time. The
reader will notice that besides the Aristophane-essay, the present study draws here and there from Schlegel’s other
writings on Classical topics, which are taken for the most part from vol. 1 of the Kritische Ausgabe, and to a lesser
degree from vol. 11. Schlegel’s letters to his brother August, particularly those written between 1793 and 1795, are
used to clarify certain aspects of Schlegel’s methodology and approach; these are taken from vol. 23. Likewise,
Schlegel’s unpublished sketch of a system of aesthetics (1795/96) entitled Von der Schönheit in der Dichtkunst aids
in the same pursuit. Lastly, my formulation of Schlegel’s early political beliefs is based largely on his publication,
Versuch über den Begriff des Republikanismus, which is in vol. 7. For an entire list of the individual publications,
sketches, and letters cited in this study, see the table dedicated to that end in the appendix.
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II

Publication History and Review of Secondary Research

Friedrich Schlegel’s investigation of Aristophanes’ plays, and reassessment of their
contemporary worth, was a relatively small undertaking. It was part of a general study of Greek
– and to a lesser extent Roman – literature, which occupied him intensely over the course of
several years, and the resulting essay, Vom ästhetischen Werte der griechischen Komödie, which
his study of Aristophanes’ plays engendered, can only be accurately understood in this context11.
After his move to Dresden in 1794, Schlegel embarked on a partly systematic, partly
random study of Greek literature, reading virtually everything on the subject that he could get his
hands on, and making plans for studies that began to multiply “in verwirrender Anzahl”12. By
April 1794, the impetus behind his various studies had coalesced into a more comprehensive
project, one that would constitute both a history of Greek literature and a genre-centered theory
of literature that developed from his historical account and at the same time helped make sense
of it:

Das Werk ist […] von noch größerm Umfange, als Du angiebst. – Die Geschichte der
Griech.[ischen] Poesie ist eine vollständige Naturgeschichte des Schönen und der
11

Years later (1822), Schlegel reflected fondly on the supreme importance of the Greeks for him in his youth: “In
dem ersten Jünglingsalter von etwa siebzehn Jahren, bildeten die Schriften des Plato, die tragischen Dichter der
Griechen, und Winckelmanns begeisterte Werke, meine geistige Welt und die Umgebung, in der ich lebte, und wo
ich mir, in meiner dichterisch nachdenkenden Einsamkeit, wohl oft auch nach jugendlicher Art, die Ideen und
Gestalten der alten Götter und Helden in der Seele vozubilden versuchte” (KAIV 4).
12
In July of 1795, he had sketched out in a letter to his brother the various studies he was planning. They included,
“Über antiken und modernen Republikanismus”, “Über die Grenzen des Schönen”, “Sophokles”, “Fragment aus
einer Geschichte der attischen Tragödie”, “Vom Wert des Studiums der Griechen und Römer”, “Über die Diotima”,
“Über die Darstellung der Weiblichkeit in den griechischen Dichtern”, “Über die politischen Revolutionen der
Griechen und Römer”, “Theorie der Geschichte der Menschheit”, “Über die alte Religion”, “Briefe über den
Plutarch”, “Über den griechischen Rhythmus”, and “Alte Politik in zwei Bänden” (Let to A.W. 7-4-1795). What is
perhaps most surprising is not the number of studies that Schlegel was undertaking simultaneously, but rather the
fact that Schlegel actually finished a majority of these planned studies and eventually many more.
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Kunst, daher ist mein Werk – Aesthetik. Diese ist bisher noch nicht erfunden, sie ist
das philosophische Resultat der Geschichte der Aesthetik und auch der einzige Schlüßel
derselben (Let. to A.W. 4-5-1794).

Schlegel planned on publishing a two-volume work, Die Griechen und Römer, which – he
had hoped – would be authoritative as an aesthetic treatise and as a Classical literary history
(Behler Einleitung CLXI); the first volume would discuss theory, the second would apply it to
Classical praxis. Ultimately, only the first volume made it to paper, but it did establish Schlegel
as an authority on Classical literature13. Based on this publication, it was certainly imaginable
that he was poised for an illustrious career as a Classical philologist, and that he would be
successful in his wish to do for Greek literature, “was Winckelmann für die bildende [Kunst]
versuchte; nämlich die Theorie derselben durch die Geschichte zu begründen” (KAIII 334).
This, then, is the context in which Schlegel wrote his Aristophanes-essay. And though he never
developed it further into the section on Greek comedy that he intended for the uncompleted
second volume of his planned work, it nevertheless became, on its own, one of the most famous
works from Schlegel’s early career, and its high praise for Aristophanes is one of the main
reasons behind the ‘rediscovery’ of that author in 19th century Germany.
Predictably, scholarship into Schlegel’s early writings, and particularly the Aristophanesessay, has waxed and waned, taking various forms, depending on its perceived contemporaneous
relevance.

However, research into these early writings on Classical literature has always

remained “ein Stiefkind in der Forschung” as Hans Dierkes wrote in his expansive study of

13

The form that the first volume eventually took already shows Schlegel’s move away from pure
Altertumswissenschaft to the interest in modern literature which would characterize his middle – or Romantic –
period since it outlines in depth the Ancient/Modern dichotomy that would form the fundament of his notion of the
Romantik (Behler Einleitung CLXII).

11
Schlegel’s literary-historical method in 1980 (47).

Schlegel’s fame does, after all, rest

principally on the work he did between 1796 and 1801, namely his Lucinde (1799), his
Athenaeum- and Lyceum-Fragments (1797-1801), his Charakteristiken of Lessing (1798) and
Forster (1797), his Kritiken of Jacobi’s Woldemar (1796) and Goethe’s Wilhelm Meister (1798),
and his Gespräch über die Poesie (1800). In contrast to his later academic Vorlesungen and
earlier writings on Classical literature, these texts have always maintained a relevance for
subsequent generations, and the ideas expressed therein are widely considered to be Schlegel’s
unique contribution to modern literary theory14. Even today in the historiography of literary
theory, one seldom finds any mention of Schlegel’s contributions to the discipline outside of
what Walter Benjamin claimed in 1920 were the “Hauptquellen” for any exposition of Romantic
literary criticism, at least for Friedrich Schlegel’s version of it; namely, “derjenigen
Schlegelschen Arbeiten im ‘Lyceum’, ‘Athenäum’, [und] in den ‘Charakteristiken und Kritiken’
[…] welche unmittelbar den Begriff der Kunstkritik bestimmen” (Benjamin 13). Generally
speaking, scholarship on Schlegel within the field of Germanistik has tended to be concerned
with this subject – Romantic literary theory – and with the corresponding works that Benjamin
mentions.
In the 1960’s, due in large part to the publication of a wealth of previously unpublished
material in the Kritische Ausgabe, one notices a new interest in previously underrepresented
aspects of Schlegel’s career. And if the rule before had been rather to focus on the “Romantic”
Schlegel independent of his work before and after that phase, then one sees, as Raimund
14

Helmut Schanze, in his summary of modern Schlegel-scholarship, says for example that Schlegel’s work on the
theory of the novel is what has had the largest historical impact: “…gleichwohl kann immer noch der Beitrag
Friedrich Schlegels zu[r] […] Konzeption und Programmatik des ‚Romans’ als eines universellen
Ausdrucksmediums, als der historisch wirksamste gewertet werden” (Schanze 5).

12
Belgardt wrote in 1967, “daß sich in neueren Arbeiten ein Schlegel-Bild abzeichnet, dem die von
der älteren Forschung scharf durchgeführte Aufgliederung und Einteilung der geistigen Existenz
Schlegels in eine frühe ‘klassische’ (bis 1796), eine mittlere ‘romantische’ und eine spätere
‘katholische’ (1808 Übertritt zur kath. Kirche) Period weichen muß” (Belgardt 322)15. But this
new interest in emphasizing the continuities that span the various phases of Schlegel’s work
should not be overemphasized. In Belgardt’s study, as in the work of Richard Brinkman (1958)
and Karl Polheim (1961) – two other scholars who place an emphasis on the study of continuities
in Schlegel’s thought –, the primary aim is still the best possible understanding of Schlegel’s
Romantic literary theory; they simply maintain that one cannot properly understand it without
studying its genesis, that is, without studying his work on Greek and Roman literature. If Walter
Benjamin’s aim was “nicht das Werden seines [Schlegels, MB] Begriffs der Kunstkritik, sondern
diesen selbst dar[zu]stell[en]” (Benjamin 13), then it is precisely this “Werden” that scholarship
after 1960 turned increasingly towards16. This is evidenced, for example, by the fact that a 1985
collection of scholarship nominally dedicated to Schlegel’s Kunsttheorie put out by Helmut
Schanze still includes, for the most part, texts that focus on Schlegel’s Romantische
Dichtungstheorie. Thus it is not so much the object of interest, but rather only the method of
exposition, which has changed. It should be clear, then, why one must be particularly wary

15

Karl Konrad Polheim, writing in 1961, echoes a similar sentiment. For him, newer Schlegel research, in contrast
to pre-war scholarship, “fass[t] Friedrich Schlegel in seiner Gesamtheit auf, sie beton[t] die ungebrochene
Kontinuität seiner geistigen Entwicklung, die organische Zusammengehörigkeit der einzelnen Phasen” (Polheim
280)
16
This is, for example, the perspective that Matthias Dannenberg (1993) takes in his study of Schlegel’s early (preRomantic) literary-theoretical method as is evidenced in the title of the work itself: Schönheit des Lebens: eine
Studie zum „Werden“ der Kritikkonzeption Friedrich Schlegels. It is clear from the title that Dannenberg already
starts from the premise that these early writings of Schlegel’s are to be understood as something inchoate, as in a
process of “Werden”, which in turn, presupposes that his later “Romantic” writings constitute something of a
fruition.
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while wading through the secondary research when the aim is – as in this study – to understand
Friedrich Schlegel’s early literary-theoretical method, independent and irrespective of what he
may have later gone on to do, when so much of the available scholarship, if it focuses on this
early period at all, then very often still does so with one eye to the direction in which he was
going. In the section that follows, I will therefore give an overview of the available scholarship
relevant for an understanding of Schlegel’s Aristophanes-essay. The essay has, in fact, made its
way into some unexpected nooks and crannies of research, and it has, independent of Schlegel’s
Romantic literary theory, and even independent of his other writings on Greek and Roman
literature, had something of a life of its own.

II.1 Reception of Schlegel’s Aristophanes-Essay in the 19th and Early 20th Centuries

In one sense, Dierkes’ claim in 1980 that Friedrich Schlegel’s Classical studies had always
been a “Stiefkind” in research is not entirely accurate (47). They did actually enjoy genuine
popularity during Schlegel’s own lifetime and for several decades afterwards. In fact, they now
carry the dubious honor of having lost their initial relevance in the field of Classical Studies
(Altertumswissenschaft) only to gain increasing recognition within the field of German Studies.
In preparing for the republication of his writings on Classical literature for an edition of his
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Sämtliche Werke in 1822, Schlegel could remark with pride in his Vorrede, that these writings
had, despite their flaws, found a positive reception in Classical Studies in the interim17:

Und wenn diese Arbeit, ihrer vielen Mängel ungeachtet, die bei solchen Gegenständen,
und in diesem Alter kaum vermeidlich waren, dennoch von den ersten und
bedeutendsten Gelehrten in dieser Wissenschaft der Altertumskunde günstig
aufgenommen worden ist; so verdankt sie dies wohl dem Umstande, daß sie ganz nach
dem einen rein künstlerischen Standpunkte entworfen, und daß dieser so streng darin
durchgeführt worden (KAI 570).

One of Schlegel’s primary objectives in these writings had, after all, been philological in
nature; he had been working towards the publication of the aforementioned two-volume work,
Die Griechen und Römer, which would have constituted a comprehensive literary history of
ancient Greece and Rome.
A perusal of Volker Deubel’s 1973 Forschungbericht for Friedrich Schlegel shows,
however, that in the 20th century, these writings were rarely discussed in Classical Studies except
for perhaps in their obvious and limited role in the historiography of Classical literary studies in
Europe. Rather the vast majority of publications on Schlegel’s early work now come from the
fields of Germanistik and philosophy, and are motivated by a desire not to better understand
Classical literature, but rather to better understand the roots of Romantic literary theory,

17

Behler indicates that among those who positively received Schlegel’s works could be counted F.A. Wolf,
Christian Gottlob Heyne, Friedrich Creuzer and Alexander von Humboldt. Humboldt wrote of Schlegel’s Classical
studies in a letter to Varnhagen von Ense in 1833: “Ich habe sie fleißig studiert und mich überzeugt, daß viele
Ansichten des hellenischen Altertums, die die Neuern sich zuschreiben, in Aufsätzen vor 1795 […] begraben liegen”
(Behler KAI LXXIVf.). [Humboldt quote taken from: Briefe von Alexander von Humboldt an Varnhagen von Ense,
4. Aufl., New York 1860, pg. 10.] Further Behler claims: “Charles Andler und René Wellek haben auf eine
bestimmte Tradition der klassischen Altertumswissenschaft in Deutschland aufmerksam gemacht, die sich direkt
von den Brüdern Schlegel, besonders von Friedrich Schlegel herleitet und Auswirkungen bis auf Friedrich Wilhelm
Ritschle und auf Friedrich Nietzsche hatte” (Behler Einleitung LXXIVf.).
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particularly as an outgrowth and dialectical response to German Idealism, and the historicization
of philosophy at the turn of the 18th century18.

II.2

Post-WWII Research Trends

Post-war scholarship on Schlegel’s Aristophanes-essay can be grouped under four
general categories, which differ from one another both in terms of methodological approach and
in terms of their respective use of the essay19.
1. The Aristophanes-essay often turns up in scholarship on Friedrich Schlegel’s
early aesthetic philosophy, presenting as it does, a relatively concise illustration
for the genre ‘Comedy’, of what he wished his general theory of literature to be.
2. The essay is also mentioned in scholarship on Schlegel’s political philosophy.
This is a limited field, since it is debatable in the first place whether Friedrich
Schlegel even had anything like a coherent political philosophy.

But the

Aristophanes-essay, in so far as it examines the reciprocal dependency of
theatrical comedy and socio-political organization in Classical Athens, is relevant
for any examination of Schlegel’s early political beliefs. These two research

18

See Volker Deubel’s “Die Friedrich Schlegel-Forschung 1945-1972” (1973).
I choose the end of World War II as my dividing line in handling the relevant Schlegel-scholarship for two
reasons: first of all, there was a noticeable growth in scholarly interest in the Weimarer Klassik and in the Romantik
after the war. This coupled with the second reason – namely, that the complete works of Schlegel (Kritische
Ausgabe) were published in 1958 bringing to light vast amounts of previously inaccessible material – led to a
renewed interest in Schlegel after the war, an interest that tended – moreover – to look increasingly at Schlegel’s
entire career.
19
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areas will be the main sources for the supplemental material that I will draw on to
best understand Schlegel’s theory of comedy.
3. Further, however, the essay is often read as a theoretical foundation for German
Romantic Comedy.
4. The essay also comes up in research in so far as it is relevant in the history of the
reception of Aristophanes.
The latter two research areas will only be discussed briefly, since they have only limited
and tangential applicability for the purposes of the present study.

II.2.1 Scholarship on Schlegel’s Early Aesthetic-Philosophical Method

The primary focus of this thesis – the socially and politically predicated conditions of
Schlegel’s theory of comedy – necessitates not only a formal understanding of the aesthetic
theory of comedy Friedrich Schlegel develops in the Aristophanes-essay, but also an
examination of his general beliefs in the interdependency of art and society at the time of its
publication (1795). It necessitates thus a sound understanding of Schlegel’s early philosophical
and aesthetic attitude. To be sure there is no dearth of literature that tackles this very question,
but as mentioned above, often with the intention of better understanding his later thought. This
is, for example, the case with Dierkes (1980), Behrens (1984), Schanze (1966), Michel (1982),
Dannenberg (1993) and Mennemeier (1971), all of whom offer exhaustive accounts of
Schlegel’s pre-1801 literary theoretical thought from his earliest writings on, but who ultimately
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aim at discovering the genesis of what became his Romantic literary theory. Though each study
is motivated by a slightly different question – Behrens and Dierkes are concerned with
Schlegel’s Geschichtsphilosophie whereas Dannenberg and Michel trace the development of his
closely related Kritikkonzeption – each extracts an overarching philosophical approach from
Schlegel’s early corpus of publications, which each of Schlegel’s early writings in turn
exemplifies to a greater or lesser degree.

Implicit in many of these studies is an attempt to

situate Friedrich Schlegel’s proper place in the canon of German literary theory20. Even when
research focuses on Schlegel’s early (pre-Romantic) aesthetic project as an end in itself, it
nevertheless attempts to cull from his overall writings on Greek and Roman literature their
general underlying system21.

To my knowledge, there is no research that examines the

Aristophanes-essay alone and attempts to extract from it that which it purports to offer, namely a
serious theory of comedy. Brummack’s chapter on Schlegel in Satirische Dichtung (1979)
comes closest to a logically rigorous reconstruction of his theory of comedy, though here,
Brummack’s objective is to pin down Schlegel’s peculiar attitude towards satire. I engage with
Brummack in chapter IV.5 of this study, as it will be seen that Schlegel’s understanding of satire
yields certain fundamental implications with respect to his theory of comedy.
Some scholars, for example Dannenberg and Behler, have alluded to the fact that the
Aristophanes-essay constitutes the most realized encapsulation of Schlegel’s early method. In
20

Dierkes and Michel both dedicate entire chapters to the debate surrounding Schlegel’s proper place in the history
of German literary theory; whether, for example, Schlegel belongs to the discipline of Aesthetic Theory, stretching
from Kant and Hegel through to Benjamin and Adorno in the 20th century as, for example, Achim Geisenhanslüke
holds in his Einführung in die Literaturtheorie (2006), or whether Schlegel is better understood as standing within
the modern tradition of Hermeneutik, beginning with his peer, Friedrich Schleiermacher, and running through
Dilthey in the 19th century to Gadamer and Szondi in the 20th century, as Dierkes and Michel hold.
21
This is, for example, Kraus’ approach in his study, Naturpoesie und Kunstpoesie im Frühwerk Friedrich Schlegels
(1985).
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limiting his scope to just comedy, he successfully realizes what he had only hoped to achieve for
literature in general, namely, the development of a system of normative aesthetics that was
grounded in the study of Greek literature. Matthias Dannenberg, for example, claims that one
finds in the Aristophanes-essay “so deutlich wie sonst nirgendwo in seinen frühen Arbeiten zur
griechischen Antike […] [die Vermittlung] normative[r] und historisierend[er] Kunstreflexion,
ästhetische[r] Theorie und geschichtliche[r] Kunsterfahrung […] miteinander” (Dannenberg
159). Ernst Behler expresses a similar opinion when he writes; “Wie sich der dichterische
Gestaltungsprozeß konkret vollzieht, hat Schlegel in den Studien des Altertums besonders an
zwei Autoren der griechischen Literaturgeschichte illustriert, an Homer und Aristophanes.”
(Behler Einleitung CXXV).
That little or no research addresses the Aristophanes-essay in its own right should come
as no surprise, since Schlegel himself soon realized the extreme limitations of his theory, and it
has been more than clear to subsequent generations that the “system” he sketches out is not only
contradictory in parts, but also largely impractical22. The followings study, however, aims at
what amounts to a close reading of the Aristophanes-essay, an attempt to understand as best as
possible, the theory of comedy laid out therein with recourse to as little else as possible.
Schlegel saw the essay as a systematic attempt, though he soon abandoned any hopes at
comprehensive system-building.

22

See, for example Dannenberg (166), and Schere: Spielgemälde (22).
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II.2.2 Scholarship on Schlegel’s Political Philosophy

There are, it should be mentioned, a few post-WWII publications that seek to emphasize
the political aspects of Schlegel’s early method. Worth mentioning are studies by Wieland
(1968), Hendrix (1962) and Beiser (1992). All three of these studies fall victim to the impulse to
make out of Schlegel a political thinker, and to emphasize rather too much his political writings.
Though Schlegel undoubtedly nurtured a life-long interest in politics and political philosophy,
even to the point of famously working later in life for Metternich, he was motivated above all
throughout his life, irrespective of whatever intellectual project he undertook – be it political
philosophy (Versuch über den Begriff des Republikanismus) or a philosophy of life (Philosophie
des Lebens) – by artistic and aesthetic concerns. Even Heine, one of his sharpest critics, realized
and praised this in Schlegel, writing in 1828:

Die religiösen Privatmarotten, die Schlegels spätere Schriften durchkreuzen, und für die
er allein zu schreiben wähnte, bilden doch nur das Zufällige, und namentlich in den
Vorlesungen über Literatur ist, vielleicht mehr, als er selbst es weiß, die Idee der Kunst
noch immer der herrschende Mittelpunkt, der mit seinen goldenen Radien das ganze
Buch umspinnt (Heine 484).

Thus comments like Beiser’s, that for Schlegel “the aesthetic, moral, and intellectual
standpoints are ultimately subordinate to a higher one that directs all of human Bildung”, namely
the “political viewpoint” (Beiser 249), tend to distort Schlegel’s thought to prove a thesis23.
Nevertheless, in so far as these texts seek to accentuate the very component of Schlegel’s

23

Beiser also claims, for example, that “we can now see that Schlegel’s Romanticism was […] an attempt to address
[…] the political problematic of modern life” (Beiser 259).
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writings that is central to this study’s examination of his theory of comedy – that is to say, the
political – they will be of assistance.

II.2.3 Scholarship on the Relevance of Schlegel’s Essay for German Romantic Comedy

Interestingly, the only branch of contemporary German Studies which has dealt
exclusively with Schlegel’s Aristophanes-essay, without seeing it simply as a subcomponent of
his Classical writings in general, is that of German Romantic Comedy. Previously an underresearched facet of German Romanticism, it has emerged as a subject of study in its own right in
the past few decades24.

Within the context of Romantic Comedy, Schlegel’s essay on

Aristophanes is of relevance to the extent that its delineation of a theory of comedy lays the
groundwork for an understanding of the formal aspects of Romantic Comedy. Furthermore,
from the perspective of literary history, the essay is of interest in so far as it – particularly its
enthusiastic reception of Aristophanes – paved the way for the literary climate that made the
relatively experimental – and in some cases unstageable – comedies of Tieck, Brentano, Arnim
and Eichendorff possible25. However, while Schlegel’s essay may have been regarded as the
“locus classicus einer Theorie der romantischen Komödie” (Japp 17) in earlier studies – by
Catholy (1982, 184-86), Kluge (1980, 186-88) and Holl (1923, 215), for example – Japp and
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Japp traces the reason for this under-representation in scholarship to the favoritism that Romantic literary theory
itself shows for the novel over drama: “Aus sachlicher Perspektive kann […] angeführt werden, daß die romantische
Poetik selbst den Roman – und nicht das Drama – in den Mittelpunkt ihrer Interessen gestellt habe” (Japp 1)
25
These, according to Japp, are the canonical authors of Romantic Comedy. Of questionable membership to this
group are however, for Japp, the plays of Platen (Japp 11).
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later scholars limit the relevance of Schlegel’s essay for the study of Romantic Comedy to its
praise of Aristophanic stylistic devices, such as the parabasis, and Aristophanes’ literary satire26,
devices which were later adopted by the Romantics27.

Japp draws parallels, for example,

between Schlegel’s celebration of the parabasis – which, he claims, was novel for the time (Japp
23) – and Tieck’s use of it in his comedies28. Japp also sees the plays of Brentano, which he
labels as “illudierend” under his typology, as embodying Schlegel’s normative appeal that
schöne Komödie be devoid of “satirische Bitterkeit” (Japp 23f.). Japp’s study marked a sea
change in scholarship to a diminished use of Schlegel’s essay in the study of Romantic Comedy.
Perhaps the most recent, and certainly the most definitive and comprehensive study of Romantic
Comedy, Stefan Scherer’s Witzige Spielgemälde: Tieck und das Drama der Romantik (2003),
only cursorily mentions the Aristophanes-essay in a footnote29. In so far as the fundamental
drive of this research area has been to assess the applicability of Schlegel’s essay to Romantic
Comedy, the motive behind the use of Schlegel’s essay was to decipher the formal aspects of his
theory of comedy, which could be applied to contemporary dramatic praxis. Thus the contours
of Schlegel’s philosophy of history and his philosophy of life (Lebensphilosophie), which are

26

The most famous example of this is Aristophanes’ satire of the language of Euripides and Aeschylus in The
Frogs.
27
During the Enlightenment, Aristophanes had been criticized for, among other things, the use of the parabasis,
since it constituted a disruption of dramatic illusion. For example, under “Comédie”, the Encyclopédie’s complaints
of Aristophanes are that he was “qu'un comique grossier, rampant, & obscene ; sans goût, sans mœurs, sans
vraisemblance [my italics]”.
28
For example, in Der gestiefelte Kater, characters step out of their roles and address the audience; for instance,
Hanswurst: “Verzeihen Sie, wenn ich mich erkühne, ein Paar Worte vorzutragen, die eigentlich nicht zum Stücke
gehören” (Tieck 147).
29
Scherer claims, among other things, that Schlegel’s essay has been “nur teilweise zu Recht […] von der
Forschung […] als programmatische Grundlegung einer Theorie der romantischen Komödie gehandelt [worden]”
(Scherer 22).
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necessary for an understanding of how he arrived at his theory of comedy, were of no relevance
to the projects of Japp, Scherer and Catholy.

II.2.4 Scholarship on the Relevance of Schlegel’s Essay for the European,
Specifically German, Reception of Aristophanes

The last research area on Schlegel’s Aristophanes-essay that is relevant for the purposes
of the present study lies in the field of reception history. Schlegel’s essay is of interest in this
field in so far as it contributes to an understanding of the history of Aristophanes’ reception in
Germany. Interestingly, most of the Rezeptiongeschichten of Aristophanes in Germany were
written during the time of the German Empire and the Weimar Republic30; many of these take a
positivistic literary-historical approach, as is characteristic of the time period, and go no further
than to simply provide a summary of Schlegel’s contribution to the Aristophanes-reception, and
to accentuate the changes in general attitude towards Aristophanes’ plays, which he initiated.
Perhaps due to structural and methodological shifts in German literary scholarship, no
contemporary scholars, besides Martin Holtermann, have shown much interest in this aspect of
Schlegel’s essay. However, Holtermann’s Der deutsche Aristophanes (2004) is of particular
relevance here. Though continuing the tradition of Aristophanes’ reception history, Holtermann
deviates from his predecessors by focusing on the history of interest in specifically the political

30

For example Süß, Aristophanes und die Nachwelt (1911); Hilsenbeck, Aristophanes und die deutsche Literatur
des 18. Jahrhunderts (1908); Zelle, Die Beurteilung des Aristophanes im neunzehnten Jahrhundert (1900); Hille,
Die deutsche Komödie unter der Einwirkung des Aristophanes (1907); Friedländer, “Aristophanes in Deutschland”
(1932/33).
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content of Aristophanes’ plays31. In limiting his inquiry, he thus emerges with a more nuanced –
and less purely narrative – history of the German Aristophanes reception. Of particular interest
here will be Holtermann’s chapter on Schlegel, specifically its discussion of Schlegel’s
understanding of Freiheit and his notion of comedy as a democratic art form.

31

Holtermann is clear about his objective in his introduction: “Ich möchte analysieren, wie das Interesse an den
politischen Aspekten in Aristophanes’ Komödien entstand” (Holtermann 14).
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III

III.1

Cultural Landscape: Prerequisites for a Proper
Understandingof Schlegel’s Theory

Relevant Intellectual Trends in Germany in the 1790s

An understanding of the socio-political implications of Schlegel’s theory of comedy will
necessitate a reconstruction of his argument as well as an examination of his early understanding
of the reciprocal connections between art, society, politics and Bildung, and this will be the goal
of the Chapters IV and V. But it also requires, as with any text, that one understand the wider
historical context in which it was written. Germany in the 1790s found itself in the midst of
what, without exaggeration, could be termed a turning point in intellectual life, both literary and
philosophical. The Age of Enlightenment had flowered, and its program of the emancipation of
man into a free agent and the rationalization of all aspects of society is a process that many
acknowledge as still being in effect to this day. At the same time, the 1790s witnessed the first
clear indications of a dialectical response to the Enlightenment. Kant had definitively placed
limits on the possible extent of human knowledge and understanding, the nascent German
Romanticism of the late 1790s turned to literary themes, such as the fantastical, which seemed
more to emphasize man’s irrationality than his rationality, and the terrible mutation of the French
Revolution into, first a reign of terror, and then an absolute dictatorship, seemed to indicate that
liberty, equality, and fraternity might necessarily remain unrealizable ideals.
The 1790s also witnessed an incredible growth of interest in aesthetic philosophy in the
German principalities, and Goethe’s plea that his contemporaries dedicate themselves more to
the praxis of literature than to its theory is so famous because of how accurately it describes the

25
peculiar prominence of investigations into the theoretical nature of literature during this time32.
Interestingly, as Gerhard Schulz notes, aesthetics was, in fact, one of the last fields to be
subjected to the Enlightenment fervour for reexamining the previously accepted truths and
prejudices of classical authorities, and for subjecting systems and principles to rigorous
analytical examination (Schulz 216). For example, whereas the Enlightenment notion of a
continuous progression of understanding had been recognized without hesitiation in the natural
sciences, it was not until the late 18th century that Schlegel and his contemporaries began to
believe in the infinite perfectibility of art as well. Prior to this, art and taste had been understood
since classical antiquity as going through cycles that roughly mirrored the growth and decay of
nations. And even otherwise progressive thinkers like Diderot and Voltaire still held to this
traditional belief. Diderot, for example, famously postulated a “decree pronounced for all things
in this world”, namely, “the decree which has condemned them to have their birth, their time of
vigour, their decrepitude, and their end”33, and Voltaire wrote in his Age of Louis XIV, first
published in 1751, that the world had experienced only four cycles of birth, fruition, and decay in
the arts, whereby the most recent one had occurred during the age of Louis XIV34.
Not only did literary theory experience a sizeable growth during this time, however. It
also – and Schlegel’s early writings are examples of this – looked at literature from new
32

Goethe to Eckermann, March 12, 1828: “Könnte man nur den Deutschen, nach dem Vorbilde der Engländer,
weniger Philosophie und mehr Tatkraft, weniger Theorie und mehr Praxis beibringen” (Eckermann 668).
33
Citation from Behler GRLT, 97.
34
Voltaire: “Mais quiconque pense, et, ce qui est encore plus rare, quiconque a du goût, ne compte que quatre
siècles dans l’histoire du monde. Ces quatre âges heureux sont ceux où les arts ont été perfectionnés, et qui, servant
d’époque à la grandeur de l’esprit humain, sont l’exemple de la postérité” (Voltaire Siècle de Louis XIV 455).
Notice Voltaire’s use of a supratemporal normative faculty, “goût”, whereby anyone possessing this sense of taste
will clearly see that only these four ages came anywhere close to bringing the arts to a state of perfection. That
Voltaire is using the same standard of perfection for all four ages is indicated by the fact that Voltaire says that the
Age of Louis XIV is “peut-être celui des quatre qui approche le plus de la perfection” (456). Interestingly, Voltaire
did not see himself as being part of that period, feeling rather that he was writing during its time of decline.
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perspectives. Schlegel’s writings, like those of many of his contemporaries, show a growing
sense for the importance of historical context in the examination of art as well as an interest in
the fundamental drives that could be said to be constitutive of human nature and made man
receptive to art. Furthermore, they show a shift in perspective from the traditional aesthetic
approach of determining norms of literary form to an interest in the subjective reception of
literature. Lastly, there is an unmistakable programmatic undercurrent in the writings of this
period, an obsession with the role that art might play in society’s Bildung and an interest in the
positive future of humanity. The roots of Schlegel’s philosophy of history and of his
anthropological understanding of human nature will be discussed in more detail in subsequent
sections (III.3 and IV.1).

In the two sections that follow, however, it is hoped that an

examination of two historical events – the reaction to the French Revolution in Germany and the
publication of Kant’s Kritik der Urteilskraft in 1790 – will elucidate the reasons for the
programmatic style of Schlegel’s Aristophanes-essay, as well as the peculiarity of his aestheticalphilosophical method, respectively.

III.1.1 The Impact of the French Revolution on Schlegel’s Thought and Style

The French Revolution was not received in the German-speaking world as it had been in
France, as the impetus for a process of social emancipation; for that, German principalities
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lacked the necessary socio-political climate35.

Rather it was understood as a tangible

culmination of Enlightenment ideas, proof positive of the materialistic effect that words could
have36. Kant’s enthusiasm for the French Revolution can be seen in many ways to typify this
German attitude, which though it was quick to condemn the Revolution’s terrifying political
consequences, nevertheless maintained its respect for the material potential it showed ideas to
have. For Kant, the Revolution’s significance lay not in its success or its failure but in its
relevance for its spectators:

Die Revolution […] mag gelingen oder scheitern; sie mag mit Elend und Greuelthaten
[…] angefüllt sein […] –, diese Revolution, sage ich, findet doch in den Gemüthern
aller Zuschauer […] eine Theilnehmung dem Wunsche nach, die nahe an Enthusiasmus
grenzt. […] Wenn der bei dieser Begebenheit beabsichtigte Zweck auch jetzt nicht
erreicht würde, […] so verliert jene philosophische Vorhersagung doch nichts von ihrer
Kraft. – Denn jene Begebenheit ist zu groß, zu sehr mit dem Interesse der Menschheit
verwebt und ihrem Einflusse nach auf die Welt in allen ihren Theilen zu ausgebreitet,
als daß sie nicht den Völkern bei irgend einer Veranlassung günstiger Umstände in
Erinnerung gebracht und zu Wiederholung neuer Versuche dieser Art erweckt werden
sollte (Kant Erneute Frage 85, 88).

Despite any contemporary atrocities caused by the Revolution and despite the threat of its
ultimate failure, it could not, according to Kant, help but maintain its relevance as the realization
of the philosophical prophecy that induced it.

For it confirmed, as Behrens writes, that

“Geschichte selbst als machbar und planbar erfahren [werden kann]” (Behrens 13). Precisely
35

Indeed, the short-lived Mainz Republic (March – July, 1793) was the only political realization of revolutionary
ideals on German soil during the age of the French Revolution.
36
See, for example Behrens: “Die Französische Revolution wurde in Deutschland nicht als sozialer
Emanzipationsprozeß, sondern überwiegend als moralisch-philosophische Umwälzung und Verwirklichung
aufklärerisch-humanistischer Ideale verstanden” (Behrens 12). Schulz expresses a similar sentiment: “Die meisten
deutschen Intellektuellen der Zeit, die Schriftsteller, Gelehrten und Philosophen, haben die Revolution in ihren
Anfängen als eine letzte Konsequenz aufklärerischen Denkens betrachtet und begrüßt. Sie bedeutete für sie eine
Bestätigung der Erwartung; Denken und Schreiben könne die Welt nicht nur interpretieren, sondern sie auch
verändern. Diese Folgerung war für ein Land von besonderer Wichtigkeit, das seine politisch-ökonomische
Unterentwicklung mit einer hohen geistigen Kultur kompensieren konnte” (Schulz 85).
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this is what Friedrich Schlegel took from the Revolution. It informed his understanding of
history and human progress more than it influenced his early political convictions. For Schlegel,
the Revolution was interesting from the historical perspective of its place in the progress of
humanity. This is clearly expressed in his 216th Athenaeum Fragment (1798):

Die Französische Revoluzion, Fichte’s Wissenschaftslehre, und Goethe’s Meister sind
die grössten Tendenzen des Zeitalters. Wer an dieser Zusammenstellung Anstoss
nimmt, wem keine Revoluzion wichtig scheinen kann, die nicht laut und materiell ist,
der hat sich noch nicht auf den hohen weiten Standpunkt der Geschichte der
Menschheit erhoben (KAII 198).

Schlegel uses an expanded definition of revolution. The actual material changes that the
French Revolution may have caused are less relevant for him than its symbolic significance.
From the perspective of human history – of human progress – intellectual events can have as
much revolutionary force as material ones. It is the confidence that the French Revolution
instilled in German intellectuals, the belief that their words could have material force, which
lends much of the philosophy of the 1790s its programmatic flavor. We see this, not only in
Schlegel’s essay on Aristophanes, but indeed to a greater or lesser extent, in all of his early
writings, and even more explicitly during his Romantic period. His writings on Greek and
Roman literature always show themselves to be peripherally concerned with the contemporary
relevance that they can have37. In Vom ästhetischen Werte der griechischen Komödie, Schlegel
already reveals in the opening lines that he is not only concerned with understanding Greek
comedy, as the essay’s title might lead one to think, but that he also wants to show how that
37

Helmut Schanze, among others, has referred to this aspect of Schlegel, namely “die systematische Vernetzung, ja
Fundierung dieses Denkens in ‘seiner Zeit’” which he believes lends Schlegel’s work an “Aktualität […] für die
‘Moderne’” (Schanze 3f.). Thus it is Schlegel’s attempt to make his work on Classical literature contemporaneously
relevant that keeps modern scholarship interested in these works.
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understanding can illuminate the failures of contemporary comedy. “Nichts ist seltner”, he
writes, “als eine schöne Komödie. Das komische Genie ist nicht mehr frei, es schämt sich seiner
Fröhlichkeit, und fürchtet durch seine Kraft zu beleidigen” (KAI 19).
His essay is not meant to be purely scholarly; it is also polemical. Though Schlegel
doubtless wanted to understand Greek Comedy to the best of his abilities, this was ultimately
only secondary to the theory of comedy that he derived from it. And this theory was not meant
primarily as an analytical tool for interpretation, but much more as a blueprint for the future
potential of comedy. Schlegel’s ideal was that the Aristophanes-essay – and in fact all of his
writings – be revolutionary in the same way that he felt that the French Revolution, Goethe’s
Wilhelm Meister, and Fichte’s Wissenschaftslehre had been.

III.1.2 The Influence of Kant’s Kritik der Urteilskraft on Schlegel’s Aesthetic Approach

Like the French Revolution, the publication of Kant’s Kritik der Urteilskraft marks
another pivotal point in the formation of the German aesthetic climate of the 1790s. But whereas
the French Revolution’s influence was felt in nearly every field of German intellectual life,
confirming intellectuals in their belief in progress and in the power of ideas, the influence of the
Kritik der Urteilskraft was more limited in scope; its impact was felt largely in the field of
aesthetics, but here it brought radical change.

In this section, I wish to show how Schlegel’s

own aesthetic beliefs during the early period of his thought can be seen as both incorporating and
rejecting some of the fundamental changes in aesthetics that Kant’s Kritik helped catalyze.
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In short, the Kritik shifted the primary objective of aesthetic analysis from a pursuit of the
normative rules for making and interpreting art – the proper content and form required for the
attainment of beauty –, to an interest in its reception by the subject – an interest in how beauty is
perceived. To say that Kant’s Kritik did this alone would be to neglect a slow paradigm shift that
had already begun during the Sturm und Drang period. The growth of the Geniebewegung38,
which was coupled closely with the first widespread positive reception of Shakespeare in
Germany, led to a definitive structural shift away from the so-called French-influenced classicist
Regelpoetik (the emulation of the authorities and adherence to traditional aesthetic/rhetorical
rules) to a notion that both the work of art and its creator – the genius – are autonomous of any
external or predetermined rules39. Even Lessing, who in theory and praxis made a conscious
effort to divorce himself from prevailing comedic and tragic norms (e.g. adherence to the
Ständeklausel), did not advocate pure autonomy in art; his and his contemporaries’ dramas still
wished to be bound to a purpose; they had a persuasive intent external to the play itself, namely,
to compel their audiences to rational thought or – as Lessing believed in the case of the tragedy –
to awaken their sense of compassion40.
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For more on the importance of the Genie-Ästhetik in this time period see, for example, Jochen Schmidt’s Die
Geschichte des Genie-Gedankens 1750-1945, vol. 1: Von der Aufklärung bis zum Idealismus (1985).
39
Evidence of this paradigm shift is found both in dramatic praxis and contemporary theory. Many Sturm und
Drang-dramas – for example Lenz’s Die Soldaten and Der Hofmeister and Goethe’s Götz – show the obvious
influence of Shakespeare and few to none of the formalistic characteristics of the French classicist authorities, such
as, for example, fidelity to the so-called drei Einheitenlehre, to the Ständeklausel and to Wahrscheinlichkeit.
Theoretical support for art as autonomous – that is, without external purpose – was first given, according to Richard
Newald (290), in 1786 by Karl Philipp Moritz, who described the sole-purpose of the work of art, in this case plastic
art, as being „in sich selbst vollendet “ (Mortiz Über die bildende Nachahmung des Schönen 983).
40
The former is more often seen as the intent of the so-called satirische Verlachkomödie of the Enlightenment,
sometimes called the sächsische Typenkomödie (e.g. Lessing’s Der junge Gelehrte [1747]). Scherer describes the
external intent of these comedies as being the “Warnung vor den Fehlern normabweichenden Verhaltens;
Überredung zu vernünftigem, lebenspraktischen Handeln; Belehrung durch satirische Demaskierung eines Fehlers
als Torheit; dadurch moralische Besserung beim Zuschauer“ (Scherer Vorlesungen 5.5.1). The latter is associated
with Lessing’s theory of tragedy; see, for example, his Briefwechsel über das Trauerpiel: “Wenn es also wahr ist,
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The necessary consequence of this so-called Autonomie-Ästhetik, whereby an artist
created – according to his own aesthetic principles – a work whose only purpose if any should
be, as Kant wrote, an “interesseloses Wohlgefallen”, and as Moritz famously claimed, a
“Vollendung in sich selbst ”, was that aesthetics could no longer concern itself with the correct
formalistic qualities of the art-object (Kant KdU 204 §2; Moritz Über die bildende Nachahmung
des Schönen 975). Kant is explicit about the impossibility of deriving any objective rules for art:

Genie ist das Talent (Naturgabe), welches der Kunst die Regel gibt. […] Die schöne
Kunst ist nur als Produkt des Genies möglich. Man sieht hieraus, daß Genie ein Talent
sei, dasjenige, wozu sich keine bestimmte Regel geben läßt, hervorzubringen: nicht
Geschicklichkeitsanlage zu dem, was nach irgendeiner Regel gelernt werden kann;
folglich daß Originalität seine erste Eigenschaft sein müsse (Kant KdU 307 § 46).

The philosopher, therefore, must not and cannot concern himself with the mechanism
behind the creation of beauty, since for this, there can be no rational approach, and must
therefore limit his study to the judgment of beauty. Not objective beauty, but only its perception,
can be critically conceptualized41. Furthermore, since no formalistic norms for beauty can be
logically determined, any claim to universality that the judgment of beauty can have is
necessarily limited to the sphere of intersubjectivity42. The judgment of beauty must be limited
to the capacity of the community of recipients who, through debate and consensus, arrive at an
daß die ganze Kunst des tragischen Dichters auf die sichere Erregung und Dauer des einzigen Mitleidens geht, so
sage ich nunmehr, die Bestimmung der Tragödie ist diese: sie soll unsere Fähigkeit, Mitleid zu fühlen, erweitern“
(Lessing 55).
41
According to Schulz, this psychologization of aesthetics constitutes one of Kant’s most fundamental contributions
to aesthetics in the 1790’s: “Man versteht den großen Einfluß Kants auf seine Zeit nicht, wenn man seine
Philosophie nicht zugleich als Psychologie versteht.” (Schulz 216).
42
Kant: “Aber von einer subjektiven Allgemeingültigkeit, d. i. der ästhetischen, die auf keinem Begriffe beruht, läßt
sich nicht auf die logische schließen ; weil jene Art Urteile gar nicht auf das Objekt geht. Eben darum aber muß
auch die ästhetische Allgemeinheit, die einem Urteile beigelegt wird, von besonderer Art sein, weil sich das Prädikat
der Schönheit nicht mit dem Begriffe des Objekts, in seiner ganzen logischen Sphäre betrachtet, verknüpft, und doch
eben dasselbe über die ganze Sphäre der Urteilenden ausdehnt” (Kant KdU 215 § 8).
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aesthetic judgement. In other words, it is not possible to develop rules, which might indicate
how the artwork should be constructed or created.

Rather, one can only outline how a

community of subjects might make an aesthetic judgment about the (art)-object.
The radicalness of this conclusion and the depth of its impact in the German-speaking
world cannot easily be overestimated. The limit that Kant placed on the rational subject’s ability
to know any sort of objective beauty is aptly characterized by Gerhard Schulz as “das erste große
Fragezeichen” to the Enlightenment belief that the objective world could be systematically
understood (Schulz 157). And the so-called “Erkenntniskrise” that Kant inspired is one of the
reasons why so many poets from this era felt driven to aesthetic philosophy in order to ground, as
Schulz puts it, “ihre Kunst und ihr Handwerk theoretisch auf festen Boden”43 (ibid.). At the
time, few could approach aesthetics without first dealing with Kant’s Kritik, whether it was in
the form of a complete incorporation of Kant’s ideas or, on the other hand, in an attempt to
discredit them.
In Friedrich Schlegel, we see both tendencies – incorporation and repudiation of Kant’s
aesthetics – at work. His interest in Kant dates back at least as early as 1793, that is, to his years
as a law student, before he had yet decided to dedicate himself to professional writing. In a letter
to his brother August, from June 2, 1793 he writes: “Ich habe den Geist einiger großer Männer,
vielleicht nicht ganz ohne Erfolg, zu ergründen gesucht als Kant, Klopstock, Göthe,
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Most famous among writers that Kant’s Kritik influenced is perhaps Schiller, who took a break from dramatic
praxis after the publication of Don Carlos (1787) and – between 1792 and 1796 – wrote a series of aesthetic studies,
all deeply informed by Kant’s Kritik. Schulz summarizes this as follows: “Schiller hat stets die philosophische
Grundlegung für seine literarische Arbeit als notwendig empfunden” (Schulz 218). The central problem for Schiller
was that he wished to ascribe a purpose to art, which would not however compromise its unconditional autonomy.
To that end, his earlier formulation of the purpose of theater in his Mannheimer Rede (1784) as a “moralische
Anstalt”, a “Schule der praktischen Weisheit” (Schiller 194), would have been too limiting.
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Hemsterhuys, Spinoza, Schiller; anderer von weniger Bedeutung nicht zu erwähnen” (Let. to
A.W. 6-2-1793)44.
We see more explicit evidence, however, of Schlegel’s concern with the implications of
Kant’s Kritik from an unpublished fragment on aesthetics dating from 1795/96.

Here, he

postulates an “allgemeingültige Wissenschaft des Schönen und der Kunst”, through which the
“Kantische Theorie […] wiederleget [würde], nemlich die Behauptung, daß keine Theorie des
Schönen möglich sey” (KA XVI 6). The implication here is that Schlegel still believes in the
objective validity of a theory of beauty. This is, in fact, of central importance in understanding
Schlegel’s early writings, that although they were all published after Kant’s three critiques, thus
in the critical era, they still pursue traditional metaphysical – i.e. pre-critical – aims45. This is
why it makes sense for Schlegel to speak – as he does in the Aristophanes-essay – of “die
eigentliche Komödie” and “die Natur des Komischen” (KA I 20) as objects that can be pursued
and described. According to Dannenberg, Schlegel treats Ideas in their Platonic sense, as
“metaphysische Wirklichkeiten, […] objektiv-konstitutive Prinzipien des Erkennens und
Handeln” (Dannenberg 30)46. This amounts to a rejection of one of the central principles of
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Schlegel’s remark is of added importance here in so far as it also shows his high regard for Hemsterhuis, whose
influence is quite explicit in the essay on Aristophanes. Hemsterhuis’ influence will be discussed in Chapter IV.1 in
conjunction with Schlegel’s notion of the fundamental human drives and of freedom. It is, in fact, remarkable that
neither Behrens (1984) nor Dierkes (1980) mentions the influence of Hemsterhuis on the young Schlegel in their
otherwise expansive treatments of Schlegel’s early critical method.
45
Dannenberg sees this as being a neglected aspect in studies on Schlegel’s Geschichtsphilosophie. Dannenberg:
“Gerade diese Tatsache findet in denjenigen Untersuchungen zu F. Schlegels Frühwerk, die ihre Darstellung erst mit
dem Studium-Aufsatz beginnen […] oftmals zu wenig Berücksichtigung” (30).
46
In fact, the influence of Plato’s dialogues on the young Schlegel has not escaped attention (see, for example:
Behler, Friedrich Schlegels Theorie der Universalpoesie, 221). Schlegel himself was clear about the influence Plato
had had on him in his youth. In his later Vorlesungen on the Philosophie des Lebens (1827) he writes, “es sind jetzt
eben neununddreißig Jahre, seit ich die sämtlichen Schriften des Plato in griechischer Sprache zum ersten Mal mit
unbeschreiblicher Wißbegierde durchlas; und seither ist, neben mancherlei andern wissenschaftlichen Studien, diese
philosophische Nachforschung für mich selbst eigentlich immer die Hauptbeschäftigung geblieben” (KAX 179f.).
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Kant’s Kritik. However, though Schlegel may have believed that his comedic ideal actually
existed in some metaphysical sense, he was also fully aware that it was an ideal, and as such,
may remain forever unrealized. Like the Platonic form however, Schlegel’s comedic ideal,
whether it has a metaphysical existence or is just a theoretical construct, nevertheless has a
practical relevance as an abstraction against which existing comedies may be compared.
Schlegel’s essay on Aristophanes does, however, show an incorporation of Kant’s Kritik
to the extent that one sees there the same shift in perspective away from an examination of the
formalistic aspects of art to a study of its reception. Schlegel’s essay concerns itself very little
with the actual structure of Aristophanes’ plays, and whenever structure is alluded to, it is only to
show in which ways this structure is symptomatic of the socio-historical context within which
Greek Comedy developed. His theory, as I will show in Chapter V, examines the ideal effect
that comedy should induce in the individual. Any play that induces this peculiar effect is a
comedy, and its aesthetic worth is in direct proportion to the degree to which it induces this
effect or serves its purpose, regardless of what formal aspects it may or may not have.

III.2

Programmatics in Schlegel’s Essay on Aristophanes

In the review of secondary research (Chapter II), I alluded to the fact that, at the time of
its publication, Schlegel’s Aristophanes-essay enjoyed a positive reception in its own right, and
not merely within the field of Classical Studies. Ernst Behler writes that during the early 19th
century, it was “eine der berühmtesten und anerkanntesten Arbeiten Friedrich Schlegels” (Behler
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KAI CXLIII). This is no small honor considering the fame and success – at least in the
intellectual community – that Schlegel would garner with his later writings. The essay’s fame
derived not so much from the theory of comedy it contained, but rather from the way in which
Schlegel used his theory both as a programmatic defense of Aristophanes as a canonical
playwright, and at the same time, as a polemical attack on what he felt was the sad state of
contemporary German comedy.

The following section examines the historical background

underlying the polemical war that Schlegel here wages, which will, in turn, make it clear why
Schlegel felt that a new comedic ideal – his ideal – was so necessary.
Schlegel begins his short essay with the bold claim that Old Greek Comedies –
particularly those of Aristophanes – represent the purest realization of the comedic ideal and this
is, in fact, the premise from which his argument develops. This was, in 1794, far from an
obvious truth. Aristophanes’ plays had fallen into disrepute in the 17th and 18th centuries. And
in preparing for the republication of the Aristophanes-essay in his Sämtliche Werke (1822),
Schlegel remarked in a footnote on the impact that his essay had had in the turn towards a more
positive reception of Aristophanes in the early 19th century:

Daß Aristophanes […] als ein Urkünstler […] neben den erhabensten Meistern der
alten tragischen Kunst seine Stelle einnehme und verdiene; das war damals, als dieser
kleine Aufsatz […] zuerst erschien, noch durchaus nicht so allgemein anerkannt, als
dieses jetzt überall zu vernehmen ist (KAI 19).

It was not only, as we might today assume, Aristophanes’ sexual licentiousness and
Europe’s later prudishness, which led to a natural condemnation of the playwright. The reasons
are in fact more varied and have as much to do with the formal aspects of his plays and
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characters as with the perceived influence of his plays in the sentencing of Socrates. Martin
Holtermann, in his reception-history of Aristophanes, writes that Aristophanes was generally
dismissed in France in the 17th and 18th centuries, “gerade auch von Interpreten, die ansonsten
die antike Literatur für vorbildlich erklärten” (Holtermann 55f.). Holtermann gives three reasons
for this trend:
1. Aristophanes’ language was criticized for its perceived “Unordnung” and “Vulgarität”.
2. His plays were criticized from the viewpoint of the hegemonic dramatic Regelpoetik.
According to critics who argued along this line, Aristophanes violated the classical
unities of time, action, and place and failed to bring his plays “zu einer befriedigenden
Abrundung”.
3. Aristophanes’ satire of public and political contemporaries was a dramatic mechanism
that was inapplicable within the context of 17th and 18th century France, and ran counter
to the literary tastes of a people writing for a court audience, where overt political
criticism was out of the question (Holtermann 54f.).
Aristophanes was criticized, thus, from a normative aesthetic standpoint for not adhering to
the rules of dramatic art and from a moral standpoint for both his perceived moral degeneracy
and for his personal satires, which one critic termed “que des libelles diffamatoires”
(D’Aubignac 81)47.

It is possible that Friedrich Schlegel, when he calls the worth of

Aristophanes’ plays “allgemein verkannt” (KAI 20), would have traced the reasons for this
misjudgment back to the same place that his brother August Wilhelm did in his 1808 lectures
Über dramatische Kunst und Literatur, namely back to Voltaire:
47

Citation from (Holtermann 55)
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Mit dem erbarmungswürdigen Uebermuthe der Unwissenheit urtheilt Voltaire […] über
Aristophanes ab, und die neueren französischen Kritiker sind meistens seinem
Beyspiele gefolgt. Uebrigens kann man die Grundlage aller schiefen Urtheile der
Neueren hierüber, und die verstockte prosaische Ansicht schon beym Plutarch in seiner
Vergleichung des Aristophanes und Menander finden (A.W. Schlegel 127).

The sweeping condemnation to which A.W. Schlegel here refers can be found in the
following widely-cited passage from Voltaire’s entry for ‘Athéisme’ in his Dictionnaire
Philosophique (1764):

Ce poète comique [Aristophanes, MB], qui n’est ni comique ni poète, n’aurait pas été
admis parmi nous à donner ses farces à la foire Saint-Laurent; il me paraît beaucoup
plus bas et plus méprisable que Plutarque ne le dépeint (Voltaire Dictionnaire
Philosophique 469) 48.

Voltaire, in turn, is referring here to Plutarch’s Comparison between Aristophanes and
Menander, in which his extreme devaluation of Aristophanes is accompanied by effusive praise
for Menander. Among other things, Plutarch criticizes Aristophanes for his “coarseness […] in
words, vulgarity, and ribaldry”, a playwright to be enjoyed only by the “rude and vulgar person”
(Plutarch 463), and for having a style with such great “varieties and dissonances in it, so neither
doth he give to his persons what is fitting and proper to each” (Plutarch 467). As was the case
with Shakespeare, so too did Voltaire’s condemnation of Aristophanes help delay the possibility
for an unbiased examination of his art on the continent. Characteristic of the criticism from

48

Voltaire’s judgment of Aristophanes is in the section on atheism because it was important for him to show who he
believed was really responsible for the unjust charge against Socrates that he was an atheist. According to Voltaire,
Aristophanes (specifically, because of his play The Clouds, in which he casts Socrates as a money-minded sophist)
is to blame above all others: “La mort de Socrate est ce que l’histoire de la Grèce a de plus odieux. […] Aristophane
fut le premier qui accoutuma les Athéniens à regarder Socrate comme un athée. […] Voilà l’homme qui prépara de
loin le poison dont des juges infâmes firent périr l’homme le plus vertueux de à Grèce” (ibid.).
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Voltaire and other French writers is the fact that it condemns Aristophanes from the perspective
of the normative aesthetics of the 18th century – what in Germany was termed the Regelpoetik49 –
and that it shows an inability or a refusal to understand Aristophanes from within the context of
the time in which he was writing.
Precisely this is what Friedrich Schlegel wished to rectify in his essay on Aristophanes, and
he did so in a radical manner50. He does not just advocate a relativistic understanding of
Aristophanes by which he, like all writers, would be judged only against contemporary aesthetic
standards. Indeed, the Aristophanes-essay is meant to outline a theory of comedy and as such is
every bit as normative as the Regelpoetik it attacks. Schlegel, at least at this time in the
development of his thought, believed that Old Greek Comedy was a necessary and sufficient
subject from which to develop a comedic theory. According to him, an understanding of “die
Natur des Komischen” could only be acquired from its purest examples and this, for him, meant
comedies that were devoid of “tragische Energie” or, to use Schlegel’s anthropological
terminology, bereft of any traces of Schmerz (KAI 20). And the only comedic genre that, for
him, met this standard, was Old Greek Comedy, precisely because of its independence from any

49

For a detailed discussion of what was understood as the dramatic Regelpoetik in Germany in the 17th and 18th
centuries, see: Manfred Fuhrmann. “Die Rezeption der aristotelischen Tragödienpoetik in Deutschland”, particularly
pgs. 93-96. Fuhrmann traces the roots of the Regelpoetik back to Aristotles’ Poetics and to Horace’s Ars Poetica.
Apart from the aforementioned ‘Mißachtung der Einheit des Ortes’, Aristophanes would have been criticized,
according to the Regelpoetik and its famous Dreieinheiten-Lehre, for failing to match the correct cast of characters
with the correct genre. According to the Regelpoetik, gods and generals, who are often in Aristophanes’ comedies
(e.g. Cleon in The Knights and Dionysus in The Frogs), belong to “die erhabene Sphäre […] der Tragödie” and were
considered unsuitable subjects for comedy (Fuhrmann 93).
50
It should be mentioned here that Friedrich Schlegel was not actually the first in Germany to praise Aristophanes’
worth in response to French criticism. This honor goes to Johann George Sulzer and Christoph Martin Wieland.
Sulzer, in his Allgemeine Theorie (1777) expresses an opinion that is very similar to Schlegel’s statement that “das
komische Genie […] nicht mehr frei [ist]” (KAI 19). Sulzer writes: “es wäre vielleicht nicht übertrieben, wenn man
sagte: daß in einer einzigen von seinen Comödien, mehr Wiz und Laune ist als man auf den meisten neuern Bühne
in einem ganzen Jahr hört” (Sulzer 215). Wieland held lectures on Aristophanes in Erfurt at the beginning of the
1770’s and later translated many of his plays into German (Holtermann 74).
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reliance on tragic elements. The opening lines of Schlegel’s Aristophanes-essay constitute a
polemical attack on the traditional understanding of comedy and hint at the radical novelty
behind Schlegel’s theory:

Das komische Genie ist nicht mehr frei, es schämt sich seiner Fröhlichkeit, und fürchtet
durch seine Kraft zu beleidigen. Es erzeugt daher kein vollständiges und reines Werk
aus sich selbst, sondern begnügt sich, ernsthafte dramatische Handlungen aus dem
häuslichen Leben mit seinen Reizen zu schmücken. Aber damit hört die eigentliche
Komödie auf; komische Energie wird unvermeidlich durch tragische Energie ersetzt:
und es entsteht eine neue Gattung, eine Mischung des komischen und des tragischen
Drama. […] Die Natur des Komischen kann man nur in der unvermischten reinen
Gattung kennen lernen: und nichts entspricht so ganz dem Ideal des reinen Komischen,
als die alte Griechische Komödie. Sie ist eins der wichtigsten Dokumente für die
Theorie der Kunst; denn in der ganzen Geschichte der Kunst sind ihre Schönheiten
einzig, und vielleicht eben deswegen allgemein verkannt (KAI 20f.).

Schlegel calls for nothing short of a complete reappraisal of Old Greek Comedy. The
implications here are far-reaching. Likely, never before and never since has anyone tried to
develop a full and systematic theory of comedy from the work of a single playwright, and
certainly not from Aristophanes. Further, according to Schlegel, there is little to nothing that
came after Aristophanes, which could be called true comedy. The inference to be drawn is that
those works, which according to previous critics were usually classified as comedies – works by
Plautus and Terence, or Molière and Shakespeare – were, for Schlegel, nothing of the sort, but
were better thought of as mixed forms, “Mischung[en] des komischen und des tragischen
Drama” (ibid.).
That the system of classification for the genre “Comedy” itself was in need of reworking
must have been obvious to many by the 1790s, and in this respect, Schlegel’s attack, however
unique its form, is indicative of a general dissatisfaction with inherited literary poetics. Critics
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during the High Enlightenment (1740s and 1750s) had engaged in a sort of theoretical
gymnastics in trying to apply the inherited genre-dichotomy “Tragedy/Comedy” to plays that
seemed to fit neither type. The outcome tended rather to expand the definition of comedy than
that of tragedy. Tragedy had, after all, been clearly defined by Aristotle in the Poetics whereas
the section on comedy had famously gone missing. Profitlich accurately describes the dillemna
in which “Kunstrichter” from this time period found themselves:

Die nur begrenzte Erlaubnis, aus dem System der etablierten Genres auszubrechen und
neue Formen, z.B. die für das klassizistische Denken suspekten Mischformen, zu
kreieren, erklärt den Eifer, mit dem eine große Zahl von Kunstrichtern v.a. der vierziger
und fünfziger Jahre die Frage erörtert, ob zu den ‘Komödien’ Dramen gezählt werden
können, die ihre Protagonisten […] statt Lachanreize zu bieten, Empfindungen,
Teilnahme, Mitleiden, Rührung erregen (Profitlich 35)51.

The catalyst for this theoretical debate, one that actually considered removing the element of
humor and its effect – laughter – from the definition of comedy, was above all the freshly
imported and increasingly popular comédie larmoyante from France (in Germany das rührende
Lustspiel), and the difficulty it posed for the traditional tragedy/comedy dichotomy. According
to Gottsched, the rührende Lustspiel depicted “das bürgerliche Leben der heutigen Welt”
(Gottsched 593f.)52, and though it tended to be sentimental and moving, it did not however end
tragically53. Its eschewal of traditional tragic elements (noble or divine personnel, tragic ending)
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Profitlich writes that Adam Daniel Richter and – of all people – Johann Elias Schlegel, Friedrich Schlegel’s uncle,
went furthest in theorizing humor completely out of comedy (Profitlich 35-37).
52
This citation is from Gottsched’s “Zufällige Gedanken über Herrn Adam Daniel Richter”. The reference is taken
from Profitlich (35).
53
For a more in depth clarification of the sub-genre ‘Rührendes Lustspiel’, see the Reallexikon’s entry. There, it is
thus defined: “Das Rührende Lustspiel konstituiert sich als eine ‘Komödie ohne Komik’ […]. Wirkungsästhetischer
Zweck des Rührenden Lustspiels ist es, daß die Zuschauer mittels Identifikation vom traurigen, aber nicht tragischen
Schicksal der Bühnenfiguren ‘gerührt’ werden” (Reallexikon ‘Rührendes Lustspiel’ 337).
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led to its classification as a comedy (Lustspiel) despite the absence of any intended laughtereffect54.
Friedrich Schlegel starts from a completely different – nearly opposite – premise from
these theorists of the High Enlightenment. Instead of widening the definition of comedy beyond
recognition, Schlegel substantially limits it and transforms it into an ideal, which only
Aristophanes has come anywhere close to achieving. This is why Schlegel labels Old Greek
Comedy “eins der wichtigsten Dokumente für die Theorie der Kunst” (KAI 20). He is careful
not to ascribe absolute perfection to it, writing instead: “nichts entspricht so ganz dem Ideal des
reinen Komischen, als die alte Griechische Komödie” (ibid.). As for contemporary comedy,
Schlegel has nothing nice to say.

Without a doubt, when Schlegel says of contemporary

dramatic praxis, “es schämt sich seiner Fröhlichkeit, und fürchtet durch seine Kraft zu
beleidigen”, the types of drama that he has in mind are the rührende Lustspiel and the so-called
Familienstücke which followed in its wake and had become ubiquitous to the point of triviality
by the 1790s55. The scorn that Goethe, Schiller, and the Romantics had for the immensely
popular Familienstücke of succesful playwrights like Iffland and Kotzebue has been well
documented56. According to Eckehard Catholy, Schlegel’s contemporaries would have easily
picked up on the essay’s veiled polemics against these types of drama:
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One need look no further than Christian Fürchtegott Gellert’s Die zärtlichen Schwestern (1747) for proof of how
unfunny comedies were becoming. The play is essentially a bürgerliches Trauerspiel with a happy ending
(marriage, as one might expect). It exemplifies the typical structure of the rührende Lustspiel: “Tugend und
Ernsthaftigkeit auf der Bühne, statt tragischem Scheitern ein glückliches Ende; Erbauung und Rührung im Parkett,
statt Schrecken und Erschütterung gerührte Erleichterung” (Reallexikon ‘Rührendes Lustspiel’ 338).
55
The Familienstück is also sometimes termed the Familiengemälde (Schulz 467).
56
See for example, Schulz, 449-455; also Glaser’s Das bürgerliche Rührstück (1969).
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Die Spitze, die sich hier gegen Schlegels erfolgreiche Zeitgenossen Iffland und
Kotzebue richtet, ist unübersehbar, auch wenn deren Namen in einer Untersuchung, die
der Komödie einer längst vergangenen Zeit gewidmet ist, nicht ausdrücklich erwähnt
werden. Die gebildeten Leser der ‘Berlinischen Monatsschrift’, in der Schlegel seinen
Essay publiziert hatte, mußten die geheime Beziehung erkennen (Catholy 186).

One of the essays intentions is that the new sense that Schlegel gives to the comedy might
help free contemporary drama of these popular Familiengemälde and Rührstücke. According to
Holtermann, Schlegel’s intention was “dem Lustspiel seiner Gegenwart neue Möglichkeiten
auf[zuzeigen].

Für Komödien in Anlehnung an Aristophanes war damit der Zwang zum

geschlossenen Drama aufgehoben und breiter Raum für Formexperimente geboten” (Holtermann
95).

III.3

Schlegel’s Early Critical-Historical Project:
Implications for the Aristophanes-Essay

As I mentioned in the preceding section, Schlegel believed Old Greek Comedy to be a
necessary and sufficient object of study for the development of a theory of comedy. Because of
the peculiar socio-political structure of Athens, comedy achieved, according to Schlegel, a state
of comedic aesthetic perfection, or as Schlegel puts it purity, that had not since been matched.
Accordingly, he believed that any theory concerned with the essence of comedy would do well to
begin there. Before I examine the reasons that Schlegel gives in the essay on Aristophanes for
ascribing such excellence to Old Greek Comedy in particular, I find it constructive to briefly
discuss Schlegel’s early attitude toward Classical literature in general, since it will be seen that
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his high praise for Greek comedy is not peculiar, but rather exemplative of his general attitude
towards Greek literature.
Nearly all of Schlegel’s early writings on Classical literature, even those on quite specific
topics – like Über die Diotima – were written with one eye towards his planned critical-historical
project of developing a system of aesthetics out of the history of Classical literature. And the
Aristophanes-essay is supported by the implicit assumption that a theory of comedy, and indeed
any adequate theory of literature, must necessarily begin with the history of its genesis, which
Schlegel traced to the Greeks. Both Hans Dierkes and Klaus Behrens, who have written detailed
studies of Schlegel’s early aesthetic-philosophical method, emphasize this historical approach as
being one of the central principles of his early theoretical attemps57. It is an interest that he
shared with many of his contemporaries; German intellectual thought in the late 18th century saw
the awakening of a more nuanced understanding of history, and practically all of Schlegel’s
literary peers, but most famously Herder, tried to deal with what they felt was the importance of
understanding the progression of history58. In Germany, writes Schulz, “leistete Herder auf
diesem Gebiet in seinen Ideen zur Philosophie der Geschichte der Menschheit grundlegende
Arbeit” (Schulz 181). Herder’s response to the traditional pursuit of supratemporal norms that
could apply equally to artworks from different historical eras was to emphasize instead the
relative historical context in which each artwork was produced. In this manner, writes Dierkes,
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Behrens, for example, calls Geschichtsphilosophie Schlegel’s “hermeneutisches Werkzeug” (Behrens 29).
Dierkes entire study of Friedrich Schegel’s early method is based on the assumption that it can best be understood as
rooted in a philosophy of history (Dierkes 11-12).
58
Schulz, in his history of late 18th and early 19th century German literature, sees the awakening of a new historical
consciousness in Germany as being one of the main cultural-intellectual trends that characterize this era (Schulz
180). In the section that he dedicates to this ‘tendency’, Schulz lists a virtual who’s-who of late 18th century German
authors who sought to understand the relevance of the history of humanity.
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Herder was able to arrive at “eine Lösung des von der ‘Querelle’ überkommenen Problems eines
universalen Geschichtsmaßstabes” (Dierkes 16). The contours of Herder’s argumentation cannot
be discussed here. Suffice it to say that Schlegel’s own Geschichtsphilosophie can be seen in
many ways as a reaction to what he saw as Herder’s historical relativism. Much as Schlegel
considered his own work in aesthetics to be a response to the limitations that Kant had placed on
the possibility for an objective theory of beauty, his Geschichtsphilosophie both incorporated
Herder’s sense for the importance of historical context while at the same time dismissing its
relativistic conclusions.

In a review of Herder’s Briefen zur Beförderung der Humanität,

Schlegel makes his criticism of pure historical relativism clear:

Die Methode […], jede Blume der Kunst, ohne Würdigung, nur nach Ort, Zeit und Art
zu betrachten, würde am Ende auf kein andres Resultat führen, als daß alles sein müßte,
was es ist und war” (KAII 54).

For Schlegel, supratemporal aesthetic norms were still possible. Their determination
simply required a far more nuanced understanding of historical context than his predecessors had
given them. They could no longer simply be the traditional norms of the Regelpoetik, but needed
instead to take into account the society, Schlegel might say the societal Bildung, that had helped
to make possible the production of a given work of art. And as we will later see, the theory of
comedy that Schlegel developed is more concerned with the socio-political context that frames
Aristophanes’ plays than the plays themselves59. Schlegel’s belief that it was precisely the
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It is noteworthy that Schlegel so often makes reference to the “alte Griechische Komödie” and far less often
mentions Aristophanes by name, even though Aristophanes’ plays are the only full examples of Old Greek Comedy
that we now possess. Schlegel wishes to derive his theory of comedy more from the practice of Old Greek Comedy
than from Aristophanes’ plays in particular. Aristophanes’ dramatic structure, his use – for example – of the
parabasis, his constant rupturing of dramatic illusion, his depiction of people who must have certainly been in the
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Greeks whose literature might form the basis for a universal theory of literature followed from
two assumptions: first, that the Greeks invented Epik, Lyrik, and Dramatik, and second, that
under the Greeks, these genres developed naturally. This naturalness is, for Schlegel, one of the
key characteristics of Classical (and specifically Greek) literature, and is one of the principle
things that separates it from modern literature.

In his early writings, he offers various

formulations of this central belief, calling the progression of Classical literature “[ein] ganze[r]
Kreislauf der organischen Entwicklung der Kunst” (KAI 307-08), or alternately “[eine]
allgemeine Naturgeschichte der Dichtkunst; eine vollkommene und gesetzgebende Anschauung”
(KAI 276). Elsewhere he describes it as “ein Maximum und Kanon der natürlichen Poesie”
(KAI 307), “das Urbild der Kunst und des Geschmacks” (KAI 287-88), and “das Höchste, was
im Systeme des Kreislaufes möglich war, ein Maximum der natürlichen Bildung: also ein
relatives Maximum” (KAI 634). For Schlegel, the Greeks were unique in that they had no
literary models outside of their own with which they could compare themselves.

Modern

literature, on the other hand, is often characterized by Schlegel as künstlich. He claims that,
under the conditions of modernity, “Absicht das Prinzip der menschlichen Bildung ist”, as
opposed to the “freie Natur” that characterized the Greeks and their literature (KAI 29). This is
why Schlegel sometimes traces the birth of modernity to Socrates who, he believes, was the first
thinker “welcher […] den Versuch wagte, Sitten und Staat den Ideen der reinen Vernunft gemäß

audience, these stylistic devices are not in themselves valuable, but only in so far as they are symptoms of the
“schöne Fröhlichkeit” and the “erhabne Freiheit” (KAI 24) that Schlegel believed were, and should be, the actual
aesthetic criteria for comedy.
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einzurichten” (KAI 636). Plato’s dialogues, he believes, could be considered the first canonical
texts of modernity60.
Another assumption that one sees as running through all the various formulations of
Greek literature cited above is that Schlegel viewed its progression as a Kreislauf. It represented,
for Schlegel, a complete and closed cycle spanning from birth, to maturity, and finally to its
death. And though it was up to Schlegel’s time rather paradigmatic to see literature as going
through cycles of growth and decay, for Schlegel, only Greek literature could be characterized as
a “System des Kreislaufs” (KAI 631). On the other hand, modern literature, by which Schlegel
meant post-Classical literature, was because of its reflectivity progressive in nature. We can see
in this early dichotomy, which Schlegel draws between acient and modern literature, an inchoate
form of what he would later term the Classical and the Romantic61. These, he believed, could be

60

The belief that the age of reflectivity began with Socrates and Plato is not peculiar to Schlegel. George Sabine,
writing on an altogether different topic (the history of political philosophy), expresses a sentiment that is quite
similar to Schlegel’s, and he sees the socio-historical impetus for the writings of Plato, which Schlegel believed
embodied the reflectivity of modernity, as being Athens’ defeat in the Peloponnesian War. “The great age of
Athenian public life”, writes Sabine, “fell in the third quarter of the fifth century B.C., while the great age of […]
philosophy came only after the downfall of Athens in her struggle with Sparta. Here, as in so many cases in history,
reflection followed achievement, and principles were abstractly stated only after they had long been acted upon”
(Sabine 21). The Greeks he writes, “probably would not have turned to philosophy, at least in the manner they did,
had the life of Athens remained as happy and as prosperous as it seemed to be when Pericles’s Funeral Oration
struck its dominant note” (Sabine 35). Greek literature’s naturalness, Schiller called it its naivité, was thus one of its
most essential qualities.
61
Schlegel was certainly not the first to draw comparisons between ancient and modern literature. The famous
Querelle des anciens et des modernes which began in the late 17th century and was fought largely in France and
England started from a similar point of inquiry and was well-known by Schlegel’s time. What was novel about the
Schlegel brothers, however, was that they approached the interpretive distinction between Ancient and Modern – or
alternately Classical and Romantic – with a more nuanced historical understanding. The brothers argued in the
wake of what Schulz calls the growing “Geschichtsbild der Aufklärung, in dem jeder Kultur und jeder Epoche ihr
eigenes Recht innerhalb des Fortschreitens der Menschheit zugestanden wurde” (Schulz 60). Thus their
comparisons of the Classical and Romantic were concerned with understanding the historical necessity of those
styles as reflections of their social, theological, even political contexts, and though Friedrich Schlegel believed, at
least during his early phase, that artworks could be judged according to an ideal, this ideal was far removed from
idealizations of literary form, and tended rather to be an ideal of beauty. And if ancients approached this ideal
within the various genres that they created, then the moderns, because of their peculiar historical condition,
approached it through the mixing of genres. This is the theoretical argument that would later allow F. Schlegel to
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distinguished from one another not only temporally, but also formalistically, that is to say, by
genre. For example, whereas Epik, Lyrik, and Dramatik are classical genres, modernity is
characterized by mixed genres: the tragicomedy, which Schlegel and his brother believed was
best exemplified by Shakespeare, and the novel, which Schlegel saw as the modern literary genre
par excellence, having the ability to incorporate all other genres, thus representing the universal
mixed-form.
In opposition to the notion of Greek literature as a fully realized Kreislauf, Schlegel
repeatedly characterizes modern literature as in a state of progression, as “ewig nur werden, nie
vollendet” (Behler Einleitung CIX). This is most succinctly put when he famously writes that
modern – or Romantic – literature is a “progressive Universalpoesie” (KAII 182 [Fragment
116]). Schlegel arrived at this understanding of modernity after he began turning his focus to
modern literature in 179562 and used Condorcet’s mathematical notion of infinite perfectibility63
as a way to characterize modern literature as being in a state of infinite progress.
Since, for Schlegel, the essence of modern literature is its mixing of genres, and the fact
that it is – in an Enlightenment sense – a progressive project which can never be completed, it ill
lends itself as a basis for the development of an aesthetic system which wishes to identify the
find worth in both ancient and modern literature; they were, according to him, doing different things. Perhaps the
most comprehensive definition of how the Schlegel brothers understood the Classical/Romantic distinction can be
found in the first of A.W. Schlegel’s lectures Über dramatische Kunst und Literatur (1808).
62
Schlegel began engaging in intense studies of Lessing, Forster, Jacobi’s Woldemar, and Goethe’s Wilhelm Meister
in 1795 (Behler Selbstzeugnisse 48).
63
Schlegel terms this characteristic of modern literature as “d[ie] unendliche Fortschreitung” (KAI 631). Condorcet,
in his Esquisse d’un tableau historique des progrès de l’esprit humain, which Schlegel reviewed in the summer
1795, applied the notion of infinite perfectibility from infinitesimal calculus to the Enlightenment notion of the
progress of humanity, thereby finding a scientific, thus unassailable, defense of progress. Condorcet: “The
perfectibility of man is truly indefinite: and […] the progress of this perfectibility, from now onwards independent
of any power that might wish to halt it, has no other limit than the duration of the globe upon which nature has cast
us” (Condorcet 3). For more on the Condorcet-Schlegel connection, see Behler, German Romantic Literary Theory
66-68.
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essence or ideal of the various genres, as it was Schlegel’s intent to do. In fact, we can take his
claim – “die Natur des Komischen kann man nur in der unvermischten Gattung kennen lernen”
(KAI 20) –, and say that this is what he ultimately wished to do for all literary genres. Ideally,
Schlegel would have developed an aesthetic system explaining the ideal comical, the ideal
tragical, the ideal lyrical etc. It is indicative of the influence that Kant had in turning aesthetic
philosophy away from the pursuit of developing ideal norms for literary forms, that Schlegel
does not characterize his own project as the pursuit of the ideal comedy, but rather of “das
Komische”. And, in fact, the theoretical paradigm in the early and mid 19th century was rather to
concern oneself with the comical and the tragical, as it were, and not primarily the comedy and
the tragedy64. The ambitious nature of Schlegel’s project makes it understandable why he was
never able to finish it. But in his theory of comedy, one finds perhaps the most fully realized
subsystem of what he had envisioned as a universal system, whose description he never
completed.
64

A perusal of Profitlich’s two-volume collection of German dramatic theory from the Baroque to the 20th century
shows that, beginning in the 1790’s, theorists begin to concern themselves less with die Komödie and die Tragödie
and rather more with das Komische and das Tragische. This is most apparent in the dramatic theories of Schlegel,
Schelling, Hegel, and Schopenhauer. Szondi, in his Essay on the Tragic, speaks of the aesthetic pursuit of the tragic
as opposed to the tragedy as beginning with Schelling. I was, unfortunately, unable to obtain a copy of the German
original. Szondi writes: “Since Aristotle, there has been a poetics of tragedy. Only since Schelling has there been a
philosophy of the tragic. […] Aristotle’s text strives to determine the elements of tragic art; its object is tragedy, not
the idea of tragedy. […] The realizations it thereby achieves […] are meaningful not in themselves, but rather in
their significance for tragic poetry, whose laws are to be derived from them” (Szondi Tragic 1). However, already
in Schlegel, we see a definitive turn away from viewing the dramatic form as the primary end. What a comedy’s
form and content should be is left completely open. Schlegel does not yet, however, take the radical step that
Schelling does and this is precisely the point for Szondi. Schelling’s aesthetics go so far that they eschew any
concern for the drama (the tragedy) whatsoever, not only in its form, but also in its effect and social function: “By
no longer focusing on the effect that the tragic has on the audience but on the phenomenon of the tragic itself,
[Schelling] commences the history of the theory of the tragic” (Szondi Tragic 7). On the other hand, Schlegel’s
anthropological approach in aesthetics, as we will see, still necessitates that his primary concern be precisely the
play’s – or more specifically beauty’s – effect on its audience. What separates Schlegel from his Enlightenment
predecessors (particularly Lessing) who likewise argued from the perspective of dramatic effect, is first of all, that
Schlegel sees art as bringing the individual’s disparate fundamental drives into harmony, whereas Lessing saw art as
having a rationalizing social-didactic function, and second of all, that Schlegel, like his contemporaries (Schiller,
Moritz, Kant) emphasizes the freedom and autonomy that art must have in order to be beautiful.
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IV

Towards Schlegel’s Theory of Comedy as
Argued in his Essay on Aristophanes

As I stated in the introduction, the aim of the present study is to arrive at an
understanding of the socially predicated components of Schlegel’s theory of comedy. To that
end, the present chapter focuses on retracing Schlegel’s line of argumentation in order to gain an
accurate and logically sound understanding of his theory of comedy. It is my intention that, in
approaching Schlegel’s essay thus, that is, via a close reading, we will be able to see to what
extent his notion of comedy rests on his understanding of the socio-historical context out of
which it arises. Illustrating this dependence will, I hope, make it clear why the normative
component of his theory of comedy itself presupposes certain normative beliefs as regards what
is proper for society.
Given his eschewel of literary theories grounded in formalistic norms, Schlegel’s essay
on Greek Comedy does not begin with a description of Aristophanes’ plays. Rather, his theory
develops from an anthropological premise. His strategy is to start by outlining what he believes
to be the fundamental characteristics of human nature that make the individual receptive to
comedy. And from there, he hopes to show that classical Athenian society and the comedy
which arose out of it, allowed for this receptivity to be realized. If in his early writings, Friedrich
Schlegel treats Geschichtsphilosophie as a tool for understanding how literature and culture
develop over time as a reflection of the historical context out of which they arise, then
anthropology – what Schlegel calls Lebensphilosophie – is, for him, what grounds literature and
beauty as supratemporal human necessities, manifesting themselves through all eras, in greater or
lesser degree, as a function of cultural cultivation (Bildung). It is, as Dierkes calls it, “der
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apriorische Ansatz” (Dierkes 47), that which Schlegel’s entire understanding of historical
development presupposes.

IV.1

Anthropological Basis: The Concept of “Freude”

Schlegel begins his argument by giving an explanation of the dialectical interplay between
two basic human drives – Freude and Schmerz – which he believes are activated by and
represented in art.

Only later in the essay does it become clear how these drives relate

specifically to comedy. As I hope to show, a close examination of the concepts of Freude, and
to a lesser degree Schmerz, as they are used in this essay are of importance, not only because
they underlie Schlegel’s theory of comedy, but also since they form, as Brummack writes,
“ein[en] Grundbegriff in der Anthropologie des frühen Schlegel”, and thus help make sense of
the social function Schlegel believes art to have as a necessity of human nature (Brummack 14).
The entire passage on the concepts Freude and Schmerz is given below as it forms the basis for
the analysis that follows:

Die Freude ist an sich gut, auch die sinnlichste enthält einen unmittelbaren Genuß
höhern menschlichen Daseins. Sie ist der eigentümliche, natürliche und ursprüngliche
Zustand der höhern Natur des Menschen; der Schmerz erreicht ihn nur durch den
geringeren Teil seines Wesens. Rein-sittlicher Schmerz ist nichts als entbehrte Freude,
und rein-sinnliche Freude nichts als gestillter Schmerz; denn der Grund des tierischen
Daseins ist Schmerz. Aber Beides sind nur Begriffe; in der Wirklichkeit, bilden beide
heterogene Naturen in durchgängiger Gemeinschaft ein Ganzes – den Menschen,
verschmelzen in einen Trieb – den menschlichen; der Schmerz wird sittlich, und die
Freude wird sinnlich (KAI 21).
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Schlegel presents two interpretive dichotomies that elucidate what he considers to be the
difference between animal and human nature:
1. Sittlichkeit/Sinnlichkeit, and
2. Freude/Schmerz
Whereas the term Sinnlichkeit is relatively straightforward – sensuality seems a sufficient
translation – Sittlichkeit is rather more difficult. The meaning it assumed in German philosophy
during the late 18th and early 19th centuries is different, though related to, the translation that is
conventionally given – morality. The way that Schlegel uses the term seems to accord with the
various definitions for Sittlichkeit that Grimm’s Wörterbuch cites Schlegel’s contemporaries as
giving; namely the human capacity to act according to the intellect, as opposed to the purely
instinctive reaction that arises out of sensual stimulation65. Whereas all sentient beings are per
definition sinnlich, only humans are sittlich.
While the same animal/human distinction can be made for Freude and Schmerz – Freude is,
according to Schlegel, purely human – it is not at first clear what exactly these terms indicate, or
rather, how they should be treated. According to their conventional meanings, one would think
of Freude (joy) as purely an emotion and of Schmerz (pain/sorrow) as, in one sense, a sensory
experience, and in another, an emotion. And Schlegel does indicate that, for him, Schmerz
originates in the senses, since he writes: “der Schmerz erreicht ihn [den Menschen, MB] nur
durch den geringeren Teil seines Wesens” (KAI 21). He also acknowledges that in humans as
opposed to in animals, Schmerz can take on a more emotional or ‘sittlichen’ character, in which
65

This formulation is taken from various definitions and examples from Schlegel’s contemporaries, which Grimm’s
Wörterbuch gives. For example, Schiller is cited as writing, “Sittlichkeit ist Bestimmung durch reine Vernunft”, and
according to Kant, “Übereinstimmung einer Handlung mit der Form des r. (reinen) Willens ist Sittlichkeit’’ (Grimm
Deutsches Wörterbuch ‘‘Sittlichkeit).
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case it develops into something like sorrow or suffering. Freude, on the other hand, is for
Schlegel an essential and distinguishing quality of human nature. More than simply an emotion,
it is, as he writes, “der eigentümliche, natürliche und ursprüngliche Zustand der höhern Natur des
Menschen” (ibid.). It is important to note that Schlegel emphasizes the fact that he is treating
Freude and Schmerz as idealized human drives. Their separation from each other occurs only at
the conceptual level; they are “nur Begriffe”, as he says (ibid.). In fact, in a later edition of the
essay (1822), Schlegel changed the original sentence, “Aber Beides sind nur Begriffe” to “Aber
Beides sind nur Begriffe der Absonderung”, which seems to indicate more firmly that they are to
be taken as practical constructs66. “In der Wirklichkeit”, as he writes, “bilden beide heterogene
Naturen in durchgängiger Gemeinschaft ein Ganzes – den Menschen, verschmelzen in einen
Trieb – den menschlichen” (ibid.). Both drives must be thought of as working simultaneously in
man. That Schlegel was adamant about the inseparability of human drives – that is, that they
only represent idealized constructs – is evident if we look at an early unpublished sketch on
aesthetics by him.

There he writes: “Das Thier und der Geist sind so vereinigt, daß die

Gemeinschaft ihrer Triebe absolut ist; ein innigerer gegenseitiger Einfluß ist nicht denkbar”
(KAXVI 27).
Matthias Dannenberg claims that Schlegel’s pronouncements in the Aristophanes-essay and
elsewhere in his early writings on human nature are part of a general intellectual current in the
18th century, which sought to discover man’s purpose through an examination of his essential
qualities. Above all Plato, François Hemsterhuis (himself a Platonist), Schiller, and Ernst Platner
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Interestingly, in a letter to his brother from 1793, Schlegel defines “die strenge Absonderung” as “nur Werk des
Verstandes” (KAXXIII 142). Thus, critical thought is for Schlegel something that categorizes and separates but
which, in the process, can misrepresent its object.
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are, for the young Schlegel, “Anknüpfungspunkte für eine Wiederaufnahme traditionellmetaphysischer Fragestellungen” (Dannenberg 26f.).

Characteristic of this attitude is an

understanding of man as a dualistic being, representative of both animalistic and divine
tendencies.

Hemsterhuis famously understood this as man’s amphibian nature, which man

adopted after his fall from grace (Hemsterhuis 279). And Ernst Platner, expressing a similar
sentiment, calls man “weder Körper noch Seele allein”, but rather “die Harmonie von beyden”
(Platner XV)67. Both of these formulations share with Schlegel the attempt to explain human
nature by way of its perceived differentiation from animal nature. And all three describe this
difference by way of an unempirical metaphysical appeal; for Hemsterhuis, it is man’s divinity,
for Platner his ‘Seele’ and for Schlegel his ‘higher nature’.
We might best arrive at an understanding of what Schlegel means by Schmerz – and from
there approach Freude – by examining Hemsterhuis’ dialogue Alexis, in which one finds a
definition of man that is parallel in structure, though somewhat different in content from
Schlegel’s.

According to Diokles, Alexis’ mentor and interlocutor, animals are completely

motivated by displeasure arising from want and their sole purpose is to alleviate it.

Also ist die Begierde, die erste Sensation, die in der tierischen Natur entsteht, aus der
Empfindung eines Bedürfnisses und der eines Gegenstandes, der dies Bedürfnis
befriedigen könnte, zusammengesetzt; und folglich ist vor dem Genuß die Begierde
eine Unlust (Hemsterhuis 231f.).

Schlegel echoes this sentiment when he writes in the Aristophanes-essay: “Der Grund des
thierischen Daseins ist Schmerz” (KAI 21). Animals experience only Schmerz and its alleviation
67

That Schlegel was acquainted with Hemsterhuis’ philosophy is evidenced by the already-cited letter to his brother
from 1793. In the same letter, he mentions Ernst Platner as one of the authors of “weniger Bedeutung”, which he
had been reading of late (KA XXIII 101).
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or avoidance; in other words, they are beings that vacillate between Schmerz and Nichtschmerz.
For Diokles, what distuingishes humans from animals is man’s capacity for freedom, though in
his view, most humans do not in reality actualize this capacity. “Es [gibt] wenig freie Menschen,
[….] und eigentlich [ist] nur der Weise frei” (Hemsterhuis 236). Hemsterhuis here echoes the
characteristic Enlightenment sentiment that humans free themselves through the proper use of
their distinctive intellectual capacity.

Importantly, the concept of Freude plays no role in

Hemsterhuis’ dialogue. For him the relevant distinction is between the necessity of animal pain
and the freedom of human wisdom. For Schlegel, however, who is tailoring his anthropology in
his Aristophanes-essay to an ultimate determination of comedy, Freude, and not wisdom, is the
leading theoretical concept68. Neverthless both make the claim that though animals are bound by
necessity, those characteristics or drives that are distinctly human – for Hemsterhuis wisdom, and
for Schlegel Freude – do not exist as a matter of course in humans, but rather as a potentiality,
the active realization of which makes one human. For both Schlegel and Hemsterhuis, the
question of human nature is inseparable from the question of the human purpose. Freude is not,
according to Schlegel, a purely sensory emotion, i.e. not merely pleasure, and thus is not to be
confused with Freud’s understanding of the pleasure-principle as the psychological desire to
increase one’s pleasure69. Rather for Schlegel, Freude is, as Brummack indicates, both an
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I draw the conclusion that Schlegel tailors his beliefs on human nature in this essay to their relevance for comedy
because I have not found any mention of the concept of Freude anywhere else in his writings. The implication that I
draw is that Freude is, in Schlegel’s view, not the main distinguishing characteristic of humans, as Hemsterhuis
treats wisdom, but rather that it is perhaps one of many.
69
In fact, Freud’s pleasure-principle is only the negative formulation of Schlegel’s definition of the animal as a
being that seeks to alleviate its (natural) Schmerz and thus would not apply in the least to humans as Schlegel
understands them. See for example, Freud’s definition of the pleasure-principle: “Wir glauben, daß [der Ablauf der
seelischen Vorgänge] jedesmal durch eine unlustvolle Spannung angeregt wird und dann eine solche Richtung
einschlägt, daß sein Endergebnis mit einer Herabsetzung dieser Spannung, also mit einer Vermeidung von Unlust
oder Erzeugung von Lust zusammenfällt” (Freud 3).
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anthropological and an ethical concept70; after all, as Schlegel writes, Freude is “an sich gut”
(KAI 20). Later in the same essay, Schlegel writes that Freude is “ein Symbol des Guten” (KAI
21). Schlegel’s use of the word ‘Symbol’ is of central importance. In the 1822 edition of the
essay, Schlegel clarified by writing instead of simply “ein Symbol des Guten”, “ein Symbol oder
die sinnbildliche äußere Erscheinung des Guten [my italics]”. Freude, much like Hemsterhuis’
freedom, is an ideal. It can only exist purely as an idea, as a symbol. According to Schlegel,
Freude in its pure form can only be depicted and beheld; it can only be glimpsed in its pure form
as a “sinnbildliche äußere Erscheinung”. This is where the role of comedy comes into play for
Schlegel. Specifically, comedy is precisely this symbol of Freude. Under Schlegel’s theory,
comedy’s essential element is that it is a symbol of man’s capacity for pure joy. As Schlegel
writes a few lines later, “mit der Hoffnung ungehinderter Vereinigung, scheint die letzte Hülle
der Tierheit zu verschwinden; der Mensch errät den völligen Genuß, nach welchem er nur
streben kann ohne ihn zu besitzen” (KAI 22). Thus, in the aesthetic depiction of pure Freude,
which Schlegel believes the Old Greek Comedy came closest to achieving, we appear to be
finally successful in our aspiration to divorce ourselves from our animal nature.
In a letter to his brother, August Wilhelm, dating from October 16, 1793, we see an
inchoate formulation of the more nuanced anthropological aesthetics laid down in the
Aristophanes-essay. Specifically one notices the same desire to pin down man’s “Bestimmung”
and to transfer those findings into an aesthetic reflection about what gives the “Dichter” and the
“Gedicht” their “Werth”:
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“Der ethischen Formulierung [der Freude] […] kann man also die anthropologische an die Seite stellen”
(Brummack 16)
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Die Richtung auf Gott und der Genuß Gottes ist […] nicht unsre ganze Bestimmung,
aber unsre höchste. Ein Mensch hat so viel Werth als Daseyn, d.h. als Leben, Kraft und
Gott in ihm ist. Hat er aber auch viel Kraft und Leben, sind diese aber im Streite mit
dem Gott in ihm, so wird er immer ein häßlicher Mensch, ein verächtlicher Dichter, und
sein Urtheil schief seyn. – Dieser Maaßstab gilt auch für einzelne menschliche Werke;
also ein Gedicht z.B. hat so viel Werth als menschliche Lebenskraft darin ist. Dazu
gehört aber auch die Richtung aller Theile auf das höchste Ziel; und was anders ist
Sittlichkeit? (Let. to A.W. 10-16-1793).

There is a striking similarity between Schlegel’s description in the Aristophanes-essay of
Freude as an expression of “höher[es] menschliche[s] Dasein” and his definition in the citation
above for man’s “höchste[r] Bestimmung” as “die Richtung auf Gott und der Genuß Gottes”.
Both the experience of Freude and the act of gravitating towards God are, as Schlegel puts it, our
highest, though “nicht unsre ganze Bestimmung”. This early formulation highlights the latent
use in the Aristophanes-essay of what Dannenberg characterizes as “der Topos von der
Verähnlichung des Menschen mit Gott” (Dannenberg 26)71. In other writings it is more explicit,
as, for example, in a letter to August Wilhelm dating from August 28, 1793 where Schlegel
states: “Unsre Würde [ist] Gott ähnlich zu werden” (Let. to A.W. 8-28-1793). It is interesting to
note that, for Schlegel, when the individual exhibits a disharmonious combination of “Kraft und
Leben” with “dem Gott in ihm”, this results in das Häßliche, i. e. in an insult not to goodness,
but to beauty; it is aesthetically displeasing.
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This is a topos, which Dannenberg dates back at least as early as Plato, who – it has already been mentioned – was
one of Schlegel’s favorite authors, and if we look at an excerpt from a dialogue from Plato’s Middle Period – the
Theaetetus – we see a formulation of man as a corrupted reflection of the gods which is similar to Schlegel’s own
formulation in the above-excerpted letter. In Theaetetus, Socrates is explaining to his interlocutor, Theodoros, that
evil, “having no place among the gods in heaven, of necessity […] hover[s] around the mortal nature, and this
earthly sphere”. And he continues, “wherefore we ought to fly away from earth to heaven as quickly as we can; and
to fly away is to become like God, as far as this is possible; and to become like him, is to become holy, just, and
wise.” (Plato 72).
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An understanding of the concept of Freude and its relation to art is easier if we recast it in
the more explicitly theological terminology that Schlegel’s uses in the above-cited letters. His
comments are not religious; they might even be construed as atheistic.

Rather, it is only

theological symbolism that he uses. He transfers the traditionally theological/mythological72
metaphor of man as a being, hovering between completely unreflective animalness and
omniscient and benevolent divinity, to a normative aesthetic one of man striving, through art, to
approximate his divinity.

This theological symbolism is generally not very overt in the

Aristophanes-essay but is nevertheless unmistakable when Schlegel writes: “In dem Höchsten,
was er fassen kann, erscheint dem Menschen das Unbedingt-Höchste; seine höchste Freude ist
ihm ein Bild von dem Genuss des unendlichen Wesens” (KAI 22). Thus, in Schlegel’s view, the
realization of Freude is a postive goal, approached in the comedic act.
Ernst Behler, in a short biography of Schlegel meant for popular consumption, gives one
of the most detailed accounts of what beauty means for the early Schlegel. Its anthropological
foundation is unmistakable. I’ll include here the excerpt in near entirety, first of all because it is
perhaps one of the best elucidations of what the concept of Schönheit means for Schlegel, but
also because it is closely related to the concept of Freude, since Freude is the primary
component, for Schlegel, that determines a comedy’s aesthetic beauty:

Schönheit ist für ihn [Schlegel, MB] das Resultat einer glücklichen Harmonisierung von
zwei antagonistischen Trieben in der menschlichen Brust, von denen der eine in
ungeschmälerter Natur verharren möchte, während der andere danach strebt, die Natur
zu überwinden und die eigentlich menschliche Sphäre als ein Reich bloßer Kultur oder
Kunst zu errichten. Schönheit ist, mit anderen Worten, das Resultat einer ästhetischen
Erziehung, welche den tief eingewurzelten Dualismus des Menschen zur Versöhnung
72

I use both terms (theological and mythological) here because the metaphor is found throughout both Greek and
Christian thought.
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bringt. Dieser besteht darin, daß wir als geistige Lebewesen aus zwei verschiedenen
Naturen zusammengesetzt sind – aus Sinnlichkeit und Vernunft, aus Trieb und Geist,
Rezeptivität und Spontaneität, Notwendigkeit und Freiheit, Tierheit und Menschheit
(Behler Selbstzeugnisse 34).

As Schlegel writes in the Aristophanes-essay, “Leben und Geist sind unzertrennlich” in
man (KAI 21); thus the aesthetic goal is not the subsumption of Leben to Geist or vice versa, but
rather, as Behler puts it, the “Harmonisierung” of both “in der menschlichen Brust”. Further,
Behler points out the normative Bildungskonzept latent in Schlegel’s understanding of Schönheit.
If Schönheit results in a harmonization of the natural and cultural spheres, then art’s effect is to
bring about a conciliation of this inherent dualism, a mediation, which results in beauty. For
Schlegel, art cultivates a mediation between, as Behler puts it, one’s “Sinnlichkeit” and one’s
“Vernunft”. The notion of Schönheit here is social. Pure beauty may be represented in the art
object itself, but it is only experienced, and thus only gains validity, as an approximation in the
individual. This occurs as a product of the right sort of Bildung, and Bildung – that is cultivation
– only makes sense as a social phenomenon. The artistic phenomen is thus dialectical; its
success depends on the art object and on a person’s or a society’s ability to experience or
appreciate the object. In the case of comedy – as reflected in the Aristophanes-essay –, the
realization of beauty is a function of the comedy itself as a symbol of Freude and of a society’s
capacity for Freude. Schlegel calls for “eine Bildung des Menschen durch Freiheit und Natur
[…], wo alle seine Kräfte ihrem freien Spiel und ihrer eignen Entwicklung ungehemmt
überlassen sind”. And he continues that once this is achieved, “dann wird der Mensch, seine
Bildung und seine Geschichte, ein gemeinschaftliches Resultat seiner beiden heterogenen
Naturen” (KAI 24). In the following section, I explore what this cultivation of an unrestricted
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freedom means for Schlegel, how it relates to comedy and the concept of Freude, and how
Schlegel believes it is best achieved.

IV.2

‘Inner’ Freedom in Man and in Dramatic Form as
Prerequisites for the Experience of Freude

After discussing the anthropological basis for the concept of Freude, and postulating it as
“der höchste Gegenstand der schönen Kunst” (KAI 22), i.e. comedy73, Schlegel turns to a
discussion of how Freude is to be treated both in its relation to comedy and to comedy’s
audience. He does this by way of discussing Freude’s essential qualities. In short, he claims:
“Schöne Freude muß frei sein, unbedingt frei. Auch die kleinste Beschränkung raubt der Freude
ihre hohe Bedeutung, und damit ihre Schönheit” (KAI 22). Freedom is thus the necessary
precondition par excellence for the attainment of “schöne Freude”; if Freude is subjected to
limitations in any way, it is necessarily hindered: “Zwang der Freude ist immer häßlich, ein Bild
der Vernichtung und der Schlechtheit” (ibid.). Schlegel follows by describing what he means by
freedom and he gives both a moral-anthropological and a social-political definition of the term.
Freedom is achieved, per definition, “durch das Hinwegnehmen aller Schranken”:

Eine Person also, die sich bloß durch ihren eignen Willen bestimmt, und die es offenbar
macht, daß sie weder innern noch äußern Schranken unterworfen ist, stellt die
vollkommne innre und äußre persönliche Freiheit dar. Dadurch daß sie im frohen
Genusse ihrer selbst nur aus reiner Willkür und Laune handelt, absichtlich ohne Grund
oder wider Gründe, wird die innre Freiheit sichtbar; die äußre in dem Mutwillen, mit
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Based on context, I make the assumption that by ‘schöne Kunst’, Schlegel means comedy.
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dem sie äußre Schranken verletzt, während das Gesetz großmütig seinem Rechte
entsagt (KAI 23).

There is an aspect of this conception of freedom that is wholly in keeping with the
Enlightenment notion of freedom. It is hard to overlook the similarity between Schlegel’s
formulation that freedom means “sich bloß durch [den] eignen Willen [zu] bestimm[en]” and
Kant’s famous definition that Enlightenment means having the freedom and courage to use one’s
own reason74. In both we see the realization of freedom as being not only a passive but also an
active process, as being something that cannot only be granted and protected, but must also be
actively willed. Schlegel makes the distinction between inner and outer freedom; Kant calls it
“geistlicher” and “bürgerlicher” freedom (Kant Beantwortung 41). However, whereas Kant’s
spiritual freedom has more to do with the instrumentalization of one’s capacity for rational
thought – the awakening from “Unmündigkeit” (Kant Beantwortung 35), as it were –, Schlegel’s
definition of inner freedom is tailored to its relevance for comedy. It is depicted in the person,
“dadurch daß sie im frohen Genusse ihrer selbst nur aus reiner Willkür und Laune handelt,
absichtlich ohne Grund oder wider Gründe”. Thus Schlegel’s freedom is far more anarchical
than Kant’s, and it is anathema to rationality, which must always necessarily be motivated by a
purpose. Schlegel’s inner freedom is not only without purpose; it is against purpose. It is the
freedom to act purely arbitrarily, and to enjoy doing so. Only with this sort of freedom can
Freude be attained, or at least strived after.
Just as Schlegel first defines Freude as an anthropological function of human nature and
then transfers the concept to its symbolic depiction in art, so too does he first describe freedom in
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“Sapere Aude! Habe Muth dich deines eigenen Verstandes zu bedienen! ist also der Wahlspruch der Aufklärung.
[…] Zu dieser Aufklärung aber wird nichts erfordert als Freiheit” (Kant Beantwortung 35f.)
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the personal sense, and then hint at what this implies for the art object. It should be mentioned,
however, that many of Schlegel’s explanations leave something to be desired, and it is difficult
not to agree with Dannenberg that Schlegel’s definitions of the terms Freude and Freiheit come
off in places as somewhat “verschwommen” rather than “klar und deutlich” (Dannenberg 166).
For example, Schlegel avoids citing many concrete examples from Aristophanes’ plays, which
would have made some of the most confusing aspects of his distinctions clearer. Nevertheless,
to the extent that Schlegel discusses how previous critics misjudged Aristophanes’ dramatic
form, he implicitly hints at those formalistic aspects of Aristophanes’ plays, which are indicative
of the Freude and Freiheit that he is referring to. “[Man] wirft […] dem Aristophanes vor: seine
Stücke seien ohne dramatischen Zusammenhang und Einheit, seine Darstellungen in Karikatur
und unwahr, er unterbreche oft die Täuschung” (KAI 30). These are the familiar Enlightenment
criticisms of Aristophanes.

He was disparaged for failing to adhere to one of the central

principles of the Regelpoetik that drama be believable, that it have vraisemblence, as the French
called it and that the cultivation and maintenance of dramatic illusion (Täuschung) be pursued.
Maintaining dramatic illusion was, after all, one of the principle motivations behind the so-called
Lehre von den drei Einheiten, according to which the ideal play was to take place in one setting,
ideally last as long as the staging itself but no longer than 24 hours, and have a unified plot with
beginning, middle and end (Einheit von Ort, Zeit und Handlung). These unities were thought to
be requisite for maintaining dramatic illusion. For Schlegel, however, these stipulations are too
constricting for comedy, and constitute in his terminology the very “Schranken” that must be
removed if pure Freude, and consequently pure comedy, is to be achieved. If, as Schlegel says,
the inner freedom necessary for Freude is represented in the person by arbitrary purposeless and
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life-affirming action, then the same holds true for what he believes is true comedy. It cannot be
subject to dramatic norms. For him, the breaking of traditional dramatic norms “ist nicht
Ungeschicklichkeit, sondern besonnener Mutwille, überschäumende Lebensfülle, und tut oft gar
keine üble Wirkung, erhöht sie vielmehr” (KAI 30). Thus the formal manifestation of comedic
freedom is complete purposelessness. Furthermore, the plot has no responsibility to truth in its
depiction of characters. That Aristophanes’ depiction of, for example, Socrates in The Clouds is
a “Karikatur und unwahr” is, in Schlegel’s view, no grounds for criticizing the beauty of the play
itself (ibid.). According to A.W. Sclegel, who – some have claimed – drew heavily from his
brother’s essay on Aristophanes for his lecture on Old Greek Comedy (1808), the Athenians did
not understand the depiction of living characters in Greek Comedy as having anything to do with
the actual people themselves75. It was obvious to them that the stage versions were gross
caricatures of their living counterparts:

Man lasse sich dadurch nicht täuschen, daß die alten Komiker lebende Menschen
genannt und mit allen Umständen auf das Theater gebracht haben, als ob sie deswegen
in der That bestimmte Individuen dargestellt hätten. Denn solche historische Personen
haben bey ihnen immer eine allegorische Bedeutung, sie stellen eine Gattung vor: und
so wie in den Masken ihre Gesichtszüge, so dennoch ist dieß beständige Anspielen auf
die nächste Wirklichkeit […] sehr wesentlich für die Gattung (A.W. Schlegel 131).
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A.W. Schlegel was in many ways the great popularizer of his brother’s literary theories. His Vienna lectures on
dramatic literature, though original in their own right, particularly in their understanding of Shakespeare, borrowed
heavily from Friedrich Schlegel’s work on Classical tragedy and comedy and from his literary-historical subdivision
between Classical and Romantic. Oskar Walzel has, among others, written of August Wilhelm’s debt to his brother
in this respect: “Schon Marie Joachimi-Dege hat gezeigt, daß Wilhem in den Wiener Vorlesungen d[ie]
Anschaung[en] seines Bruders popularisiert und trivialisiert” (Walzel Methode? 39). Holtermann echoes a similar
attitude: “Friedrich Schlegels Gedanken wurden durch die einflußreichen Vorlesungen seines Bruders August
Wilhelm Schlegel allgemein verbreitet und von verschiedenen Komödientheoretikern aufgegriffen und
weiterentwickelt” (Holtermann 92). Consequently, A.W. Schlegel’s lecture on Old Greek Comedy will hereafter be
used as a surrogate for or an explanation of what Friedrich Schlegel’s more obscure formulations might mean.
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This is in keeping with the playfulness that both Friedrich and August Wilhelm Schlegel
ascribe to Old Greek Comedy. They believed that its participants – both actors and audience –
understood it as a play in the truest sense, as something that had no necessary responsibility to
accuracy in depiction. It is therefore a moot point to debate about whether a play is faithful to
reality since it cannot help but have some connection to reality, being that it is made by humans
and addresses human situations, no matter how outlandish its formal depiction may be. For
similar reasons, Friedrich Schlegel believes that dramatic illusion can never actually be broken,
since the cultural practice of staging a play naturally implies a pretense to accepting depicted
actions as real, if only temporarily. According to him, the whole purpose of the dramatic ritual is
to actively engage the imagination in order to make-believe, as it were, that the depicted actions
are real. Aristophanes’ plays don’t break this illusion, at least not in any real sense. The
comedy, he says,

verletzt nur, um mehr zu reizen, ohne wirklich zu zerstören. In der Begeisterung des
poetischen Witzes, schadet und stört es nicht, wenn die Täuschung scheinbar vernichtet
wird; weil das Wesentliche des Eindrucks einer solchen Darstellung, nicht in dem
geordneten Zusammenhange dieser und in der Täuschung besteht, sondern in eben
jener Begeisterung des Witzes, welche alle Schranken durchbricht (KAI 30f.).

The illusion created by the comedy is genetically different from that created in the tragedy.
Whereas all the various components and actions in a tragic play must be brought into relation
with one another so as to result in the necessary implication of the tragic end, and thus must
maintain dramatic illusion in the traditional sense, comedy continually finds its end in the
various jokes (Witze) that are strung together in it. The butt of each joke or witticism constitutes
an end in itself, and must give no regard to the preceding or succeeding actions. Thus the
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destruction of what is traditionally thought of as dramatic illusion is only seemingly (scheinbar)
destroyed, since comedic illusion arises out of the enjoyment of each individual joke.
Schlegel’s understanding of comedy is more radical than it may at first seem. Comedic
theorists had often spoken of the mechanism of laughter as a constitutive element of comedy and
that which separated it from tragedy, even though this had itself become questionable with the
rise of the Rührende Lustspiel in the latter half of the 18th century. And Schlegel’s predecessors
in aesthetic philosophy had already emphasized the absolute autonomy that the artwork should
allow itself. Schlegel, however, goes further than his predecessors in so far as his theory implies
that a play can be called a comedy, which lacks any dramatic unity whatsoever, that more than
being a play in the traditional sense – i.e. with a story and characters – is more akin to an
unadulterated expression of joy. But this is precisely what Schlegel indicates with his emphasis
on Freude and Freiheit as the primary aim and mechanism, respectively, of comedy. Even the
traditionally important concept of laughter is not here seen as a constitutive element. Under
Schlegel’s conception, comedy is not meant to be first and foremost funny but rather joyous and
wanton.
Interestingly, an emphasis on the joyous and free aspect of Old Greek Comedy has
continued in modern scholarship. Dana Sutton, in her study of ancient comedy, attributes these
characteristics to the protagonists in many of Aristophanes’ plays. The Aristophanic comic
hero’s primary objective, she writes, is “to achieve his ambitions of freedom and fun” (Sutton
11). And within the context of the Dionysian festivals, considerations of “fun” and “freedom”
are, she writes, “so predominant that they override any others, including those of morality”
(ibid.).

65
August Wilhelm Schlegel manages to formulate more clearly than his brother the
purposelessness that Friedrich indicates as being an essential element in Old Greek Comedy. We
form the best idea of the Old Comedy, he says, by considering it as the direct opposite of
Tragedy:

Die Tragödie ist der höchste Ernst der Poesie, die Komödie durchaus scherzhaft. Der
Ernst besteht, wie ich schon in der Einleitung zeigte, in der Richtung der Gemüthskräfte
auf einen Zweck, und der Beschränkung ihrer Thätigkeit dadurch.
Sein
entgegengesetztes besteht folglich in der scheinbaren Zwecklosigkeit und Aufhebung
aller Schranken beym Gebrauch der Gemüthskräfte, und ist um so vollkommner, je
größer das dabey aufgewandte Maaß derselben, und je lebendiger der Anschein des
zwecklosen Spiels und der uneingeschränkten Willkühr ist (A.W. Schlegel 129) 76.

For Friedrich Schlegel and his brother, the Old Comedy is best understood, from a genretheoretical standpoint, as the complete opposite of Greek Tragedy. Thus any formalistic features
that are associated with tragedy, purposefulness (Zweckgebundenheit), restraint, earnestness must
per definition be absent in comedy77. Rather, it is purposeless freedom and the Freude, which
results, that are the constitutive elements for reine or schöne Komödie, and are also, from an
anthropological standpoint, the emotions or drives that are to be awakened in the experiencing of
the comedic act78.
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The notion of Aristophanic comedy as being sportive and playful has taken hold in modern Classical scholarship.
See, for example, Harsh: “Old comedy is one of the 'sports' of literature. Fantastic from the beginning, if we may
judge from the costumes of the komos-chorus, it deliberately cultivated its perversity" (Harsh 257).
77
This is why Friedrich Schlegel believed that in the transition from Old to New Greek Comedy, “komische
Energie” was “unvermeidlich durch tragische Energie ersetzt”, creating “eine neue Gattung, eine Mischung des
komischen und des tragischen Drama”. This is because the plays of Menander have unified plots. According to
Schlegel, the comedies of Menander borrowed from tragedy “die sanfte Wärme der Leidenschaft, welche sich oft
dem tragischen Ernst nähert, und den eigentümlichen Zauber der dramatischen Kunst, das Interesse durch die leichte
Entwicklung einer schöngeordneten vollständigen Handlung zu spannen” (KAI 32).
78
In the emphasis that Schlegel places on Freude as an important aesthetic element in Schönheit, one might be
mislead to believe that Schlegel implies that only Freude and thus, only comedy – the literary vehicle for Freude –
can be justifiably called schön. However, Schlegel is careful to indicate that Schmerz, and its dramatic vehicle,
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IV.3

‘Outer Freedom’ and the Freedom of Expression

“Äußre Freiheit” (ibid.) forms the other half of Schlegel’s definition of freedom, at least in
its relation to comedy, and it is his emphasis on the importance of ‘outer freedom’, which – as I
hope to show – securely anchors Schlegel’s theory of comedy in a more general implied theory
of society. Schlegel’s description of ‘outer freedom’ is, if possible, even more terse than his
explanation of ‘inner freedom’, but its meaning may still be gathered with relative certainty from
passages in the Aristophanes-essay. In the above-cited anthropological definition that Schlegel
gives for ‘inner’ and ‘outer’ freedom, he writes: “die äußre [Freiheit wird sichtbar] in dem
Mutwillen, mit dem sie äußre Schranken verletzt, während das Gesetz großmütig seinem Rechte
entsagt” (KAI 23). One may think of ‘outer’ freedom as roughly the same as what is known in
modern terminology as “negative liberty”79 and what Kant terms “bürgerliche Freiheit”. If
‘inner’ freedom is represented by the psychological drive to free oneself from acting in
accordance with purpose and rationality, then ‘outer’ freedom is, for Schlegel, represented by
society’s allowance to let one do so. It is, in simplest terms, what today is called the freedom of
expression.
For Schlegel, as for many authors and aesthetic philosophers towards the end of the 18th
century, the belief in art’s asolute autonomy meant not only that the artist had to keep him- or
herself from falling victim to an unreflective emulation of inherited literary norms, it also meant
tragedy, can also be classified as aesthetically schön. “Der Schmerz”, he says, “kann ein höchst wirksames Medium
des Schönen sein; aber die Freude ist schon an sich schön” (KAI 22).
79
See Isaiah Berlin’s essay “Two Concepts of Liberty”, which was first published in 1958. Berlin is one of the first
who clarified the implicit distinction between negative and positive freedom which exists in Enlightenment
philosophy, positive liberty being associated with continental thinkers like Hegel, Rousseau, Herder, and Schlegel,
and negative liberty being associated more with British philosophers such as Locke, Hobbes, and Adam Smith.
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that there could be no external restrictions placed on his or her art. For Schlegel, art’s only
motivation must be Schönheit, and “Schönheit”, he writes, is “ein ächtes erstgebornes Kind der
menschlichen Natur, und hat […] ein […] vollgültiges Recht, niemand zu gehorchen als sich
selbst” (KAI 24).

This right applies to all arts, plastic as much as literary; however, from a

socio-political perspective, Schlegel believes that literature – which expresses itself through the
medium of language – necessarily falls victim more often to social and political censorship than
other arts: “Die Poesie kommt leichter in Gefahr, dies Recht zu verlieren, als andre Künste”
(ibid.). And of all genres of literature, Schlegel believes that drama, particularly comedy, comes
most often in danger of losing its expressive freedom: “Eine bloße Äusserung des Gefühls, die
lyrische Darstellung der Freude, kommt nicht so leicht in Gefahr, ihre äußre Freiheit zu
verlieren, – desto mehr die dramatische” (KAI 22)80. Drama, as opposed to narrative and lyrical
literature, requires a greater public infrastructure and public resources for its existence.
Furthermore, for the greater part of the last 2,000 years, drama has been the only genre in the
traditional Gattungstrias81, which could theoretically be experienced by the vast majority of
society, since literacy was generally a privilege enjoyed by a small minority. Because theater
has had a greater public profile, it has at times tended to attract stronger political censorship than
literature intended only for reading. This was, for example, the case in France in the years
leading up to the Revolution. Although that country had a universal censorship (free publishing
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I take Schlegel’s implied formulation in this line – die dramatische Darstellung der Freude – to be a synonym for
comedy, since this is or should be, for him, comedy’s essential quality.
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Epik, Dramatik, and Lyrik: literature was classed into these three genres as early as Plato (in the Republic) and
Aristotle (in the Poetics), but this traditional system of classification held sway and remained relevant in Germany
into the 19th century. Goethe writes (1819), “Es gibt nur drei echte Naturformen der Poesie: die klar erzählende, die
enthusiastisch aufgeregte und die persönlich handelnde: Epos, Lyrik und Drama” (Goethe 187). All other subgenres, as it were, such as “Lehrgedicht”, “Epistel”, “Elegie”, Balade” and “Roman” (!), are for Goethe not
“Naturformen”, but “Dichtarten” (ibid.).
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and free theaters were unknown in the France of Louis XVI), it has often been noted that banned
prose literature – both erotic and political – was nearly freely distributed whereas drama
remained firmly guarded. This doubtless has to do with the fact that largely only “the court and
the high nobility” were the “prime customers” for works like the Encyclopédie, whereas drama’s
reach was far wider (Heargraves 154)82. However, according to Schlegel, the tendency to more
strongly censor theatrical output lies not so much in its function as a widely accessible medium,
but rather – and particularly in the case of comedy – because of the themes and subjects it
addresses:

Sie [die dramatische Darstellung der Freude, MB] nimmt den Stoff zu ihren
Schöpfungen aus der Wirklichkeit, ihre Bestimmung ist eine öffentliche laute
Darstellung des Lächerlichen, und ihre Freiheit ist dem Laster, der Torheit, dem
geheiligten Irrtume fürchterlich (KAI 22f.).

Comedy often addresses, and treats in a satirical manner, contemporary issues from reality;
indeed, this is one of the defining characteristics of Aristophanic comedy. He depicts the day-today particularities of polis life, not – as in tragedy – mythological events.

For Schlegel,

Aristophanes constantly tested the stability of the freedom that Athens allowed comedy by
publicly ridiculing “Laster” and “Torheit” wherever he found these things. Later in his essay,
Schlegel again offers a formulation of the singular necessity of “äussre Freiheit” for comedy:

In andern Kunstwerken ist das Genie von seiner äußern Lage unabhängig: seine innere
Freiheit kann ihm niemand rauben. Aber das komische Genie verlangt auch äußre
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For more on the proliferation of banned literature in France, see, for example, Robert Heargraves, 154-156 and
Simon Schama’s seminal study, Citizens, particularly pp. 174-83. We see an analogous situation in modern
American society where film and television – now the artistic mediums that enjoy the largest mainstream
distribution – are subject to the careful inspection of the MPAA and the FCC, respectively, whereas drama, which
has become a marginal art form, is granted nearly complete freedom, limited at most by the force of social etiquette.
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Freiheit, kann ohne diese sich nur bis zur Grazie, nie bis zum höchsten Schönen
erheben (KAI 29).

According to Schlegel, political censorship may exist without, however, endangering the
expressive freedom that tragedy, for example, requires. Greek tragedy’s plots are taken from
mythology, or in the case of Aeschylus’ Seven against Thebes, the distant past, and tend to
address questions of ‘human fate’ (KAI 25). It is not inherent to tragedy, for example, that it be
able to satirically address contemporary issues, and as such, Schlegel believes that a fully
realized tragedy, one that is schön and by implication autonomous, can be written even under
conditions of literary censorship.

However, censorship, at least as Schlegel knew it, had

generally existed for the very purpose of deterring libel against heads of state83, which is
precisely what Schlegel believes that comedy needs to be allowed to do. Thus for Schlegel, a
comedy may not even hope to be of aesthetic value, unless the community in which it is
produced fully acknowledges its right to free expression. Without this, it can achieve grace
(Grazie) perhaps, but never beauty. It is clear then, why Schlegel believes that the Athenians
came closest to achieving ‘pure’ comedy, since they were the only society known to him, which
protected comedy’s freedom of expression. The “komische Muse” was, as Schlegel writes, “nur
bei einem Volke, und bei diesem einen Volke nur eine kurze Zeit, frei” (KAI 24). Schlegel sees
the roots of this freedom in comedy’s religious origins. It was originally, “nichts anders als eine
öffentliche religiöse Handlung, ein Teil von dem Feste des Bakchus” (KAI 21). The playwright
and the chorus were considered “heilige Personen”, enjoying the protection and blessings of
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I make this distinction between censorship as Schlegel would have seen it and as it exists today, since the form
that censorship often takes in many modern republics tends to be more often of a moral character, forbidding rather
what is sexually ‘obscene’ than what is politically satirical.
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Dionysus, the “Gott der Freude” (KAI 23). Being the god of irreverence and intoxication, of
ritualistic madness, of “freeing one from one’s normal self” (Sutton 2), Dionysus’ servants in the
dramatic ritual were seen as naturally having the freedom to say anything and everything. For
Schlegel, the dramatic poets were the protected human mouthpieces of Dionysus on earth; “Aus
ihnen redete der Gott der Freude, und unter diesem Schutze waren sie unverletzlich” (KAI 23).
And with the development of Athenian democracy the original religious ritual became a political
institution:

Bald ward aus einem religiösen Institut auch ein politisches, aus dem Feste eine
öffentliche Angelegenheit, aus der Unverletzlichkeit des Priesters eine symbolische
Darstellung der bürgerlichen Freiheit. Der Chor besonders deutete auf das Athenische
Volk, welches in der Schönheit eines Spiels seine eigne Heiligkeit erblickte (KAI 24).

Comedy’s freedom of expression developed, according to Schlegel, into a symbol of
freedom itself, a symbol of the unique democracy that Athens enjoyed, under which citizens
enjoyed a widened platform for publicly presenting their grievances. Of course, this complete
freedom was only granted to drama, and did not exist for the Athenians as a civil right, nor does
Schlegel advocate the civil protection of the freedom of expression for anything other than art.
The trial of Socrates is proof enough that the Athenians had no notion of natural human rights
that could be constitutionally protected. And Schlegel takes pains to show that the freedom of
speech granted to the drama was only conditionally allowed, that is to say, protected only during
religious festivities. There is, nevertheless, some indication that Schlegel may have idealized the
freedom allowed in Aristophanes’ comedies. K. J. Dover indicates for example, that we cannot
be entirely sure that Greek playwrights enjoyed complete freedom since in Aristophanes we
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nowhere find any indication that he criticized the democratic state-system of Athens; rather, his
political satire limits itself to attacks on politicians and on political decisions (Dover 33).
However, even if Schlegel misread the situation in Athens, it does not fundamentally affect his
argument; it would simply make Aristophanic comedy less ideal according to his theory than he
had supposed it to be.

Aristophanic comedy is, after all, for him only the best known

approximation of the comedic ideal he wishes to develop.

IV.4

The Festivity of Greek Comedy

The fact that Greek Comedy’s worth relied in part on a certain political – specifically
democratic – context, does not mean that, for Schlegel, it should ideally be political in content or
aim. His theory of comedy might itself be considered revolutionary – it does, after all, radically
reinterpret the meaning of the genre to the point that it is nearly only applicable to Aristophanes
– but it is not something that in itself should carry a revolutionary or socio-critical aim. This can
already be gathered from the stipulation that the ‘inner freedom’ required of comedy means that
it cannot be bound to any purpose outside of itself, implying that it not seek to have any social or
political effect. True, the plays of Aristophanes do address political issues, and are much more
obviously political than the tragedies of Aeschylus, Sophocles and Euripides. And it might
certainly seem that Aristophanes wished to have some wider social effect than that of merely
bringing joy to his audience when he criticized prominent political figures.

However, in

Schlegel’s understanding at least, these endeavours would have been harmless because of Old
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Greek Comedy’s festive context.

It seems to be rather important to Schlegel that Greek

comedies were staged during religious festivals, and that thus whatever potentially subversive
undercurrents they contained could be rendered innocuous by the fact that it was all only
“Scherz”, taking place as they did during the festival dedicated to the god of playfulness and
intoxication.

The “Verletzung der [äußren] Schranken”, the joyous emancipation from all

societal strictures, which Schlegel believed was a constitutive element of Greek Comedy, was
according to him “nur scheinbar”, since it took place during the festivals (KAI 23). Thus any
societal criticism and personal attacks it contained could be explained as a result of the general
relaxation of standards of behavior and the bawdy spirit of irreverence towards both men and
gods that resulted from the holiday spirit (Levi 175).
This playful and societally innocuous freedom has more modern parallels. “So stellten sich
die Römer in den Saturnalien die Freiheit dar”, writes Schlegel, and “ein ähnlicher Gedanke lag
vielleicht bei dem Karneval zum Grunde” (KAI 23). In fact, we would likely not be far off the
mark in comparing Schlegel’s notion of the societal function of comedy with that, which Bakhtin
gives to the carnival in his study of Rabelais, and interstingly, Bakhtin notes that Rabelais and
Aristophanes have often been compared (Bakhtin 98). Like the Greek dramatic festivals – the
Lenaia and the City Dionysia –, the medieval carnival offers a “nonofficial […] and
extrapolitical aspect of the world” (Bakhtin 6). While it lasts, the carnival “is subject only to its
laws, that is, the laws of its own freedom. It has a universal spirit” (Bakhtin 7). Bakhtin, like
Schlegel, emphasizes the fact that the festival was extrapolitical. It constituted a space that had
no necessary connection to the world outside of itself. Thus, whatever political attacks the
comedies that are performed during the festival might have, these cannot however make it past
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the bounds of the festival because of its unique structure. All externally directed purposeful aims
are neutralized.
Thus the festival, and the understanding that the Athenians implicitly had of their festival,
meant that whatever purposefulness Aristophanes’ plays might have had, was only seeming
purposefulness. For Schlegel, this would have been obvious to the Athenians. Dana Sutton, in
her study of ancient comedy, Ancient Comedy: the War of the Generations (1993), writes that
one cannot correctly understand ancient comedy unless one considers its festive context. In fact,
she goes so far as to term ancient comedy “festive comedy” in order to emphasize this point
(Sutton x). Furthermore, the festival context in which these plays were staged is reflected in the
plays themselves. “Festive comedies”, she writes, all “tend to have a characteristic spirit and
viewpoint reflecting the festival holidays that served as their production contexts” (ibid.). For
example, in the plays, there are certain “psychological mechanisms”, later she calls them
“anxiety-reducing mechanisms”, such as “self-referential metadrama and deliberate violation of
dramatic illusion”, that “create an emotionally safe environment, and deflate comic derision”
(ibid.).

The freedom allowed in the comedies because of their festive context is, according to

Sutton, one of the reasons why the Roman senate later forced the suppression of the Bacchae
festivals in Rome (Sutton 6).
There is one key difference, however, between Schlegel’s understanding on the one hand,
and Sutton’s and Bakhtin’s on the other. Both Sutton and Bakhtin acknowledge the social role
of these festivals as mechanisms “for venting the aggravations, frustrations, and resentments” felt
by individuals (Sutton, 6). In the case of Athens, this could have been the frustrations resulting
from the powerlessness the Athenian citizens felt in the face of the gods, or in the face of

74
imminent defeat in the Peloponnesian War, or it could have been the powerlessness that certain
citizens felt towards richer or politically more powerful peers. The festival was, according to
Sutton, as such “an approved instrument of socialization” (ibid.). Though Schlegel does not
mention this function of the festivals – indeed he really only mentions Greek Comedy’s festive
nature in passing – it seems that he would have been reluctant to accept such a function. The
Greek comedy and the festival in which it was performed was primarily, for Schlegel, an
opportunity for the celebration of joy, and it was not a mechanism whereby, in allowing periodic
though innocuous ventings of frustrations, the status-quo could be maintained. He does not see
the festival as cathartic, but as purely affirmative.

IV.5

Logical Implications of Positing an Ideal: Reasons
for the Unattainability of the Comedic Ideal

It is a distinct peculiarity of Schlegel’s theory of comedy as expressed in his Aristophanesessay – moreso than any theories or beliefs that he held regarding other literary genres – that the
realization of comedic perfection is not only a function of formal requirements – in the case of
comedy, the symbolization of Freude through the depiction of purposeless [e.g. free and
unbounded] joy – but that it is also premised on, and absolutely dependent on a particular
community’s capacity for Freude. It is an ideal that can only be realized in a community, whose
members have achieved, “eine Bildung des Menschen durch Freiheit und Natur […], wo alle
seine Kräfte ihrem freien Spiel und ihrer eignen Entwicklung ungehemmt überlassen sind” (KAI
24).
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Thus the realization of the comedic ideal is, by definition, dependent on the realization of a
certain communal Bildungsideal.

This is, for example, not how Schlegel sees tragedy as

functioning. Whereas Schlegel consistently emphasizes that Greek Comedy did not achieve
ideal beauty84, he does not qualify his praise for Greek Tragedy. The Greeks did in fact realize
the ideal tragical in Schlegel’s eyes, namely, under Sophocles, and this despite the less than
utopian level of Bildung that he believed the Greeks had achieved. In fact, Sophoclean tragedy
represents for Schlegel the apex of Greek literature overall, after which he believed it inevitably
decayed. In Von den Schulen der Griechischen Poesie (1794), Schlegel calls Sophocles “das
höchste Schöne”, and considers his play to be “das Maximum der Griechischen Poesie” (KAI
14f.). In praise that it would be hard to exceed, Sophocles is elsewhere described as having
reached “das äußerste Ziel der Griechischen Poesie” (KAI 296), as having fully realized “[die]
aesthetischen und technischen Gesetze” (KAI 297).
If we return to the Aristophanes-essay we can see why, in Schlegel’s view, the tragic genre
is socio-historically capable of achieving its full potential in an imperfect society, whereas
comedy cannot. “Die Tragödie”, Schlegel claims, “spannt und erhebt ihr Publikum, hält also das
Verderben des Geschmacks so lange als möglich ab” (KAI 25). Tragedy, then, far from being
limited to the cultivation of its public, rather dignifies it [“erhebt ihr Publikum”], and can have a
positive influence on taste. “Das Komische”, on the other hand, “richtet sich, weit mehr als das
Tragische, nach dem Grade der Reizbarkeit und der Fassungskraft seines Publikums; und diese
hängen wieder von dem Maße der geselligen Ausbildung und aller Seelenkräfte ab” (KAI 26f.).
In other words, whereas tragedy, in Schlegel’s eyes, might bring out what is best in a particular
84

“Allein auch diesen Moment [vollkommner Schönheit, MB] hat die Griechische Komödie nicht erreicht” (KAI
25).
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society, comedy appeals to and is dependent on common tastes. Whereas tragedy’s intended
audience was a subclass of Athenian society consisting of the most cultivated members, the
comedy spoke to the general public, and to general tastes. And, as Schlegel explains: “[D]ie
Sitten waren schon sehr verderbt, und der komische Geschmack noch roh” (KAI 25) by the time
that Aristophanes wrote his plays.

Whereas “der Künstler Aristophanes […] sich an die

Geschichte vom Anfange der Kunst [schließt], [findet] der Mensch Aristophanes […] seinen
Platz in der Geschichte vom Verfalle” (ibid.) 85. Günter Oesterle, summarizing why Schlegel
believed the tragedy had reached “das höchste Schöne” (KAI 14), writes: “[F]ür die tragische
Kunst fielen historisch rechtzeitig die Entwicklung der Sitten und des ästhetischen Materials
zusammen” (Oesterle 444).
Schlegel is unequivocal about the absolute predication of the comedic ideal on the level of
Bildung that a society has achieved, and about the rather remote possibility that is will ever be
possible:

Dramatische Vollständigkeit ist in der reinen Komödie, deren Bestimmung öffentliche
Darstellung und deren Prinzip der öffentliche Geschmack ist, nicht möglich; wenigstens
so lange nicht möglich, bis sich das Verhältnis der Empfänglichkeit zur Selbsttätigkeit
im Menschen ganz ändert, bis reine Freude, ohne allen Zusatz von Schmerz, hinreicht,
seinen Trieb aufs höchste zu spannen (KAI 31).

There is a quite logical system that underlies Schlegel’s theory of comedy. His theory
posits an ideal of a unique sort. For tragedy, we have textual documents, namely the plays of
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Schlegel sees the Golden Age of Athens, like many scholars before and since, as lying between the victories
against Persia and the beginning of the Peloponnesian War in 431 BC. By the time Aristophanes had written his last
plays in the 380’s, Athens had suffered a terrible plague (430-29), a military debacle in Sicily (415-13), two
oligarchic revolutions and two democratic restorations. Athens had been defeated in war and its empire had been
completely dismantled.
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Sophocles, which by definition provide us with what the logician would call sufficient, though
not necessary, examples of the realization of the ideal tragical. Not so the ideal comical. In so
far as the ideal comedy has not yet been achieved there is no attribute, or set of attributes – be
they socio-political structure or having to do with dramatic form – that we could point to which
are sufficient for comedy’s ideal realization. There are, however, attributes or characteristics, the
absense of which are necessary. Many of these have been mentioned above: tragic elements like
dramatic purposefulness, restrictions on the freedom of artistic expression, audiences who are
incapable of relinquishing themselves completely to the experience of pure Freude. Thus,
though the definition of the ideal comedy might be a positive one (i.e. the positive realization of
Freude), in the examination of the societal conditions, political structures, and stylistic elements
in comedy, we are confronted everywhere with negative conditions. We can, in other words,
only know what is necessarily and sufficiently bad (or wrong), not what is necessarily or
sufficiently good (or right). This is the logical implication of Schlegel’s statement: “Allein auch
diesen Moment [vollkommner Schönheit] hat die Griechische Komödie nicht erreicht” (KAI 25).
And it explains why Schlegel believes that, from the perspective of his theory, it is rather easy to
point out the failures of Old Greek Comedy: “Aus der Natur des freien Komischen überhaupt,
und aus dem Ursprünge und Charakter der alten Griechische Komödie, erklären sich sehr leicht
ihre vorzüglichen Fehler” (ibid.).
If, according to Schlegel, the Greek Comedy did not reach a state of “vollkommne[r]
Schönheit”, then clearly, Aristophanes’ plays contain some failures, which kept them from
achieving aesthetic perfection, and obviously these ‘failures’ have nothing to do with the
traditionally-criticized lack of dramatic illusion and absence of coherent plot which, as we have
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seen, are precisely what Schlegel praises in Aristophanes. That the socio-political protection of
comedy’s expressive freedom is in itself no safeguard for a comedy’s aesthetic worth is clear;
‘external freedom’ is after all, only a precondition. The primary aesthetic objective of comedy
is, for Schlegel, Freude – both its depiction and its effect –, and ‘inner’ and ‘outer’ freedom, as
aesthetic categories, are of relevance only in so far as they promote that end; they are, so to
speak, to be treated only as aesthetic means.
Thus, whatever aesthetic ‘failures’ Aristophanes’ plays are seen to have must be understood
as being hindrances to Freude, or alternately, as promoters of Schmerz which, for Schlegel, is the
absolute opposite of Freude. Among these ‘failures’ is, surprisingly, Aristophanes’ satire, or at
least certain aspects of it. An examination of Schlegel’s criticism of Aristophanes’ satire will
make it clearer what role Schlegel believes comedy is to play in his conception of both the actual
and the ideal society. In the Aristophanes-essay, we find the following cryptic sentences:

Noch ehe sie [die altgriechische Komödie, MB] sich aus ihrem fremdartigen Ursprunge
[dem religiösen, MB] zu reiner Poesie entwickelte und völlig bildete, entartete sie schon
in persönliche und politische Nebenabsichten. Die Satire des Aristophanes ist sehr oft
nicht poetisch sondern persönlich, und ebenso demagogisch als die Art, mit der er den
Wünschen und den Meinungen des Volks schmeichelt (KAI 28f.).
This has been seen as proof that Schlegel advocates an unsatirical comedic ideal86. On the
one hand, it would seem odd that Schlegel develops his entire theory of comedy from
Aristophanes and at the same time criticizes that which Aristophanes is perhaps most famous for,
his satire. On the other hand, satire is per definition bound to a purpose. Satire is, as Stefan
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This is Niedrig’s (1950) reading of Schlegel’s theory of comedy (27). This also seems to be Japp’s (1999) reading
as well, when he states that “die äußre Freiheit die polemischen Zwecke der Satire befördert, die Schlegel gerne
fernhalten möchte” (19).
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Scherer writes, “normgebunden, weil sie aus der Perspektive der Wahrheit – einer richtigen Sicht
– heraus formuliert wird“ (Scherer Dramenvorlesungen 5.1). In this sense, it would seem that
satire, by its very nature, is at odds with the purposelessness that is the primary characteristic of
‘inner freedom’. Thus, it is easy to see why the role that satire should play in Schlegel’s notion
of ideal comedy is the source of so much confusion.
However, if we look at the above quote, it seems that not all satire, but rather only
persönliche87 satire is being criticized; it seems as if Schlegel implies that poetische satire is
permissible. It is not entirely clear what Schlegel means by persönliche and poetische satire, and
as Brummack writes, “das Begriffspaar poetische und persönliche Satire gibt es vor Schlegel
nicht, auch bei ihm ist es vereinzelt” (Brummack 25).

Brummack makes the convincing

argument that persönliche satire is not to be confused with “Personalsatire” (ibid.), which is
satire that is directed at a particular known individual. Rather persönliche satire should be
thought of as ‘personal’ in the sense that it serves the personal interests of the poet; satire, as
Schlegel writes, with “persönliche[n] und politische[n] Nebenabsichten” (KAI 29). Thus, for
Brummack, Schlegel criticizes the fact that Aristophanes uses the dramatic platform as a forum
for attacking his own personal enemies.
According to Brummack, Schlegel is here implying that there are certain forms of satire
that are not only permissible, but actually to be valued, at least within the context of an imperfect
comedy. Brummack believes that this is what Schlegel means by the following:

Bis dahin [that is, until that time when the comedy achieves its ideal, MB] wird die
komische Kunst, um die Energie zu erreichen, ohne welche alle dramatishe Darstellung
87

I leave the original German here because, as is subsequently shown, the word persönlich cannot be unequivocally
translated.
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unnatürlich und unwirksam ist, das Schlechte und den Schmerz zu Hülfe nehmen
müssen: bis dahin bleibt also auch die Erbsünde der komischen Energie die notwendige
Lust am Schlechten. Die reine Lust ist selten lächerlich, aber das Lächerliche (sehr oft
nichts anders als die Lust am Schlechten) ist weit wirksamer und lebendiger. Die
eigentliche Aufgabe der Komödie ist: mit dem kleinsten Schmerz das höchste Leben zu
bewirken (KAI 31).

It might seem like a complete contradiction that Schlegel now claims that the actual purpose
of the comedy is “mit dem kleinsten Schmerz das höchste Leben zu bewirken”; however the
context indicates that this is not the purpose of the ideal comedy, but rather that this should be
the goal of any comedy created in a society that is not yet capable of excitement in the dramatic
act which is wholly bereft of Schmerz – i.e. derision, sarcasm, mockery, ridicule, satire etc.
Brummack mistakenly sees this as being an indication that Schlegel believes that satire is not
only inevitable in unideal comedy, but that it is desirable. “Solange [die vollkommene Komödie]
nicht verwirklicht ist”, writes Brummack, “gehört, in ihrem Dienste, die Satire zur komischen
Kunst” (Brummack 23)88. According to Brummack, Schlegel believes that comedy does not
only find itself “in Wechselwirkung mit der Progression der Menschheit” (Brummack 23); in
addition, comedy “soll aber auch auf die Bildung der Menschheit zurückwirken” (Brummack
23). Thus Brummack maintains that Schlegel wants comedy to help bring about the positive
progression of humanity. If this were in fact the case, then it would make sense that Schlegel
would value satire for its didactic potential. But Schlegel repeatedly makes it clear that the
comedy, both in an ideal society and in a less than ideal society, should have no purpose outside
of itself. It can only be a reflection of the state of man, not aid in its promotion. Schlegel would

88

This sentence could be read as implying an unavoidability rather than a desirability. However, the subsequent
quote should show that Brummack does in fact ascribe a Bildungs-objective to Schlegel’s comedy. Interestingly,
Holtermann also sees Brummack as being mistaken in his interpretation of Schlegel in this respect (Holtermann 99)
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not have emphasized Old Greek Comedy’s festive context, which he believed neutralized any
satirical purpose that someone might have associated with it if he did not firmly believe in this.
Rather, Schlegel’s remarks on the role of “das Schlechte” and “der Schmerz” in comedy
must be read as indicating that Schlegel believes that until the human community is fully
actualized, comedy will simply not be able to avoid “Lust am Schlechten”. In such a society, the
most that a comedy can hope to do is minimize Schmerz as much as possible. This is what
Schlegel means when he says that the comic playright’s job is “mit dem kleinsten Schmerz das
höchste Leben zu bewirken” (KAI 31). In an ideal society, however, when individuals are
completely inwardly and outwardly free, satire will not even be able to be a part of comedy,
since there will be nothing for the society’s members to make fun of.
If Friedrich Schlegel’s normative comedic ideal is so intimately connected with the
structure of the society in which it is produced, then it makes sense to look more closely at what
Schlegel believes this society will look like. As Schlegel indicates with his emphasis on Greek
Comedy’s festive context, the relationship between society and comedy is one-way; comedy is to
have no didactic effect. Hitherto, I have alluded to the fact that the society must give free reign
to the comedic impulse, or in other words, abstain from censoring it. But can anything more be
said about the desired socio-political structure that will foster comedy? Is it only incidental for
Schlegel that Athens was a democracy or was it a necessary correlation? In the Aristophanesessay itself, Schlegel gives no definite answer, except to say that in Athens, comedy was “eine
symbolische Darstellung der bürgerlichen Freiheit” (KAI 24), which is really only a descriptive
and not a prescriptive statement. Elsewhere, Schlegel says that comedy is a function “de[s]
öffentliche[n] Geschmack[s]” (KAI 31), which is again only descriptive. To see what, in 1794,
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Friedrich Schlegel might have considered the ideal societal structure for the realization of his
comedic ideal, one is forced to look elsewhere, namely in his early political thought. In the brief
detour that follows (Chapter V), I hope to illustrate why, for Schlegel, the democratic state is the
only type of society, which could foster his comedic ideal. This will, I hope, clarify the question
of comedy’s social place and function as Schlegel understood it.
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V

Schlegel’s Early Political Thought and its Implications
for his Theory of Comedy

To speak of a political philosophy in the early Schlegel is to engage in constructive
theoretical work that is far more speculative than working out Schlegel’s Geschichtsphilosophie
or his anthropological Lebensphilosophie. To say that any formalized political philosophy can
be gleaned from the early Schlegel comes close to being a gross over-exaggeration. As Behler
writes, Schlegel only seriously started turning to politics in his works after 1804 and before that
addressed the issue only occasionally in small publications89. This is not to say that he was
apolitical. From his letters to his brother, we can see that he was interested in politics from quite
early on90. In January 1796, for example, he informed his brother: “Bin erst bei dem Politischen,
wie leicht und angenehm wird da alles von der Hand gehen, auch weit einträglicher” (KAXXIII
275). And in fact he had planned to add a third volume to his aforementioned work on Greek
and Roman literature which would have discussed primarily the political revolutions of the
Greeks and Romans, though this never actually made it to paper (Behler Einleitung XX). We
may say, that in so far as Schlegel favored to such a strong degree, all things Classical, that he
would have looked favorably upon the political systems of the ancients. And he does in fact
write in his Versuch über den Begriff des Republikanismus, which is Schlegel’s most famous
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Behler: “Unter den Werken, die Friedrich Schlegel seit 1804 verfaßt hat, nehmen Schriften historischen und
politischen Inhalts eine beherrschende Rolle ein”. Before 1804, “[hatte] Schlegel politische und historische Themen
nur beiläufig, in kleineren Gelegenheitsschriften und wenigen Fragmenten behandelt” (Behler Einleitung XV).
90
Beiser locates the root of this interest in Schlegel’s reaction to the French Revolution and his relationship with
Caroline Böhmer, herself a sort of revolutionary figure in the short-lived Republic of Mainz (Beiser 245). Behler,
on the other hand, emphasizes rather Schlegel’s Classical studies as the primary cause of his interest in politics:
“Schlegels Interesse an politisch-historischen Themen findet demnach in der Beschäftigung mit der klassischen
Antike seinen Ursprung” (Behler Einleitung XX). Obviously both aspects are probably at play here, but I tend to
agree rather with Behler that Schlegel’s Classical studies were the catalyst for his entrance into political thought.
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early political treatise, that “die politische Kultur der Modernen noch im Stande der Kindheit
gegen die der Alten [ist]” (KAVII 18). It is primarily via Schlegel’s Versuch that we may gain
insight into his early political thought.
It is best to approach Schlegel’s political thought by first noting that, for the early
Schlegel, politics – like art and religion in fact – is subservient to the great program of human
Bildung. “D[ie] Bestimmung des Menschen”, he later wrote, “ist das Wahre zu erkennen, das
Gute zu tun, und das Schöne zu genießen, und in seinem Denken, Tun und Empfinden Eintracht
zu bewirken” (KAI 627). In a sense, this can be partially understood as being the same as what
many German Enlightenment thinkers were working out (e. g. Lessing’s die Erziehung des
Menschengeschlechts, Kant’s Ideen zu einer allgemeinen Geschichte in weltbürgerlicher
Absicht, Herder’s Ideen zur Philosophie der Geschichte der Menschheit, and Schiller’s
Aesthetische Briefe), namely, the understanding of the progress of humanity and the
programmatic determination of the correct Bildung for humans. At any rate, the ideal for
Schlegel is to develop a political system, which promotes culture and cultivation on the one
hand, and harmonious life on the other. In this sense, Schlegel is decidedely outside of – and
would have been opposed to – Anglo-American political thought in the tradition of Hobbes; that
is, political thought that tended to view the state as a safeguard for the protection of individuals
from one another. Schlegel’s is a positive political ideal. Its “Fundament und Objekt”, as
Hendrix writes in his study on Schlegel’s political worldview, is “die Gemeinschaft der
Menschen” (Hendrix 9). In the Versuch, Schlegel calls for a “Gemeinschaft der Sitten” (KAVII
18), which indicates both an insistence on the value of the community and an emphasis on sociocultural cultivation (Bildung). In fact, as Beiser aptly points out, the “search for community” is
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the “fundamental leitmotiv” of Schlegel’s entire political-philosophical development (Beiser
261), which is as prevalent in his early panegyrics to republicanism as it is in his later medieval
(Christian monarchical) state-theory. Even in his republican phase, Schlegel is hostile to the idea
of the individualistic liberal state, and favors a more holistic political system. This is, in fact,
one of the conclusions of his Versuch.
Originally intended as a review of Kant’s Zum ewigen Frieden, Schlegel’s Versuch
ultimately carried the subtitle “veranlaßt durch die Kantische Schrift zum ewigen Frieden”,
which is apt, since the essay ended up being something between a review and a free presentation
of his own views.

In his Versuch Schlegel takes issue with Kant’s proposed form of

representative republicanism. In order to understand Schlegel’s approach, it is not necessary
here to go into Kant’s own political theory. Suffice it to say that Schlegel believes, unlike Kant,
that the only true form of republicanism is complete democracy91. For Schlegel, the ideal
political system would be one in which the state acts in accordance with the general will: “der
allgemeine Wille [ist] die notwendige Bedingung d[es] Republikanismus” (KAVII 16)92. But
since, for Schlegel, the general will is an abstracted idealization and cannot actually be
determined by the state, the democratic will of the majority will have to act as a surrogate for the
general will:
91 Jakob Baxa succinctly pointed out the difference in Kant’s and Schlegel’s theories of the state when he wrote the
following (1931): “Der tiefere Grund, warum Friedrich Schlegel in offenen Gegensatz zu Kant tritt, liegt darin, daß
Kant unter Republik einen repräsentativen Staat im Sinne Montesquieus und unter ‘Republikanismus’ das
‘Staatsprinzip der Absonderung der ausführenden Gewalt von der gesetzgebenden’ versteht, während Schlegel sich
als Anhänger der unmittelbaren Demokratie bekennt und nur in ihr das Urbild einer echten Republik zu sehen
vermag” (Baxa 30).
92
It is not hard here to see the influence of Jean-Jacques Rousseau and this influence has not gone unnoticed. See,
for example; Hendrix 8; Behler Einleitung XXIII; Brummack 12. Sabine characterizes the Rousseauean “general
will” as representing the “collective good, which is not the same thing as the private interests of its members. In
some sense, it lives its own life, fulfills its own destiny, and suffers its own fate” (Sabine 588f.).
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Der absolut allgemeine […] Wille [kann] im Gebiete der Erfahrung nicht vorkommen
[…], und [existiert] nur in der Welt der reinen Gedanken. […] Es bleibt hier nichts
übrig als durch eine Fiktion einen empirischen Willen als Surrogat des a priori
gedachten absolut allgemeinen Willens gelten zu lassen; und da die reine Auflösung
des politischen Problems unmöglich ist, sich mit der Approximation dieses praktischen
x zu begnügen (KAVII 16).

The determination of the general will always remain a philosophical ideal. In practice,
political organization will have to settle for a second best: the approximation of the general will
through the democratic will of the majority: “Der Wille der Mehrheit soll als Surrogat des
allgemeinen Willens gelten” (KAVII 17). Thus Schlegel shows himself to be a devout democrat.
But he also shows that for him, the ideal remains a state in which the communal spirit reigns
supreme and in which the general will takes precedence over the desires and even rights of any
of its individual citizens93. The historical example that Schlegel has in mind is, as might be
expected, Attic democracy, and more than an echo of French revolutionary ideals, Schlegel is
essentially proposing a system that is as close as possible to that which he believes to have been
achieved in Athens. It is, for him, the best possible organization of an imperfect society, which
is in fact what he saw as the purpose of political philosophy. Schlegel alludes to the practical
nature of his political thought when he writes that he sees, “in ihr [der Politik, MB] eine
praktische Wissenschaft, deren Objekt die Relation der praktischen Individuen und Arten ist”
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It is possibly indicative of Schlegel’s dissatisfaction with the notion of democratic government as the best possible
– though not perfectly ideal – surrogate for the general will, that he gave up on democracy so soon after the
publication of this essay. His turn to the medieval corporation of Christian monarchies was motivated by the desire
to find a socio-political system that could, if possible, achieve the ideal of the fully cultivated and unified society on
earth. Already in his Philosophische Lehrjahre (1796-99), we find the note: “Nie ist mehr wahre Freyheit und
Gleichheit und Brüderschaft gewesen als im Mittelalter – und in dieser wieder das beste in Deutschland” (KA XVIII
299).
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(Hendrix 9)94. Nevertheless his ideal remains, as he writes in the same essay, the “Gemeinschaft
der Sitten” (KAVII 18) that he believes the ancients had come closest to approximating95. As
Beiser writes, by “Gemeinschaft der Sitten”, Schlegel means “a society held together not only by
abstract laws but also by a common public spirit. Simply conforming to the laws is not enough
for the true state: there must also be genuine affection and love between fellow citizens” (Beiser
252). Interestingly, the argumentative approach in both Schlegel’s theory of comedy and his
political philosophy is symmetrical. An ideal is posited, which however, is either unattainable or
not yet attained, and actual models are offered – Aristophanic comedy and democracy,
respectively –, which best approximate those ideals. It would seem that the “Gemeinschaft der
Sitten” is exactly the type of society that Schlegel believes would allow for the realization of the
comedic ideal. In the Aristophanes-essay, he writes:

Sie [die Komödie, MB] wird es [das höchste Schöne, MB] erreichen, wenn […] aus
Gesetzmäßigkeit Freiheit wird, wenn die Würde und die Freiheit der Kunst ohne Schutz
sicher, wenn jede Kraft des Menschen frei und jeder Mißbrauch der Freiheit unmöglich
sein wird (KAI 29).

Certainly, democracy alone won’t be able to ensure that “jede Kraft des Menschen frei
[ist]”. This can only come from the positive self-actualization of each individual citizen, and
will thus only occur in the true “Gemeinschaft der Sitten”, as Schlegel sees it. The conditions
94

This citation is taken from Hendrix, who is quoting from an earlier edition of Schlegel’s works (not the Kritische
Ausgabe) and Hendrix gives nothing but the page number. As such, I don’t know for sure where this quote comes
from, but it must be from Schlegel’s early writings, because Hendrix is here discussing Schlegel’s theory of state
before 1802.
95
Interestingly, Kant was explicit in his belief that classical politics had been fundamentally flawed: Kant wrote of
the ancient republics that they lacked “ein repräsentative[s] System – in welchem allein eine republikanische
Regierungsart möglich, ohne welche sie (die Verfassung mag sein, welche sie wolle) despotisch und gewaltätig ist.
[…] Keine der alten sogenannten Republiken hat dieses gekannt, und sie mußten sich darüber auch schlechterdings
in dem Despotismus auflösen, der unter der Obergewalt eines Einzigen noch der erträglichste unter allen ist” (Kant
Zum ewigen Frieden 351f, 353.)
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that Schlegel stipulates above imply that “wenn die Würde und die Freiheit der Kunst ohne
Schutz sicher, wenn jede Kraft des Menschen frei und jeder Mißbrauch der Freiheit unmöglich
sein wird”, there won’t even be any need for a representative political system. What makes
democracy seem like the preferred societal structure for promoting and nuturing comedy on its
path to realization, is Schlegel’s pervasive emphasis on freedom, and on the fact that comedy,
unlike other genres, requires that all members of society work toward a universal and equal
Bildungsideal so that they can each realize their inner freedom and experience true Freude. It
seems to require not only a community of free members, but also equal members.
Thus Schlegel’s later political ideal, the feudal state, would be inadequate here because in
the feudal state, there are various classes of individuals who might achieve a certain
Bildungsideal, as it were, which is particular to their specific social class, but there is no
universal ideal that is the same for all members. Thus, though Schlegel might have believed later
that the true “Gemeinschaft der Sitten” was actually more realizable in a feudal state than in a
democracy, the comedy, at least the comedy as he posits it in this early form, is not. The only
political system in which the ideal comical is conceivable is necessarily that which allows all of
its members equal participation. And, in fact, after Schlegel turned to medieval feudalism as his
political ideal, he did change his attitude towards comedy:

Keineswegs sei die ‘Freiheit des Witzes’ statthaft ‘für die gemischte Menge, die des
Genusses dieser Freiheit gar nicht würdig ist’: es seien sonst ‘die allerunangenehmsten,
schädlichsten Folgen zu befürchten’, wie der Mißbrauch der Komödienfreiheit in Athen
zeige (KAXI 94).
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But dismissing democracy and turning to feudalism would amount to a fundamental
alteration of his theory of comedy. The feudal state would be contradictory to it. And the
adoption of the feudal state as the best political system for the attainment of the ideal community
would necessitate the construction of a radically different comedic ideal. As Schlegel indicates
in the Aristophanes-essay: “Die Freude und die Schönheit ist kein Privilegium der Gelehrten, der
Adligen und der Reichen; sie ist ein heiliges Eigentum der Menschheit” (KAI 26). Nevertheless,
one must be careful of ascribing too much explicit political substance to Schlegel’s theory. To
say, as Holtermann does, that Schlegel’s theory elevates the comedy “zu der demokratischen
Kunstform schlechthin” (Holterman 96), runs the risk of confusing what Schlegel sees as the
ideal society and the best possible society.
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VI

Conclusion

I have sought in the present study to arrive at the socio-political implications that
underlie Friedrich Schlegel’s theory of comedy as presented in his essay on Aristophanes. I
wished to show to what extent Schlegel’s aesthetic system as regards beauty and purity in
comedy presupposes a normative understanding of society, and I have tried to outline what
that normative understanding looks like. That Schlegel sought for totality in his thought,
that he saw all aspects of human existence – art, political structure, culture and religion – as
interconnected and as mutually dependent is, as I mentioned in my review of secondary
research (Chapter II), a fact that has not escaped scholarship. Dierkes (1980), Behrens
(1984), Schanze (1966), Michel (1982), Dannenberg (1993) and Mennemeier (1971) have
all – in their expositions of Schlegel’s early thought – placed special emphasis on this fact to
varying degrees. In this study however, I took this tendency in Schlegel, and looked at one
text – his essay on Aristophanes –, one that moreover, purported to offer a single theory – a
theory of comedy –, so that I might see what this interconnectedness looks like on a minute
level, what the practical implications of this tendency in his thought might be for a specific
case. This undertaking necessitated that I first extract as best as possible a workable and
systematic assessment of Schlegel’s theory in its own right, irrespective of its historical
relevance in the German reception of Aristophanes in the 19th century or in the emergence
of German Romantic Comedy. That this was a worthwhile endeavor, that something like a
workable theory of comedy could be distilled from the essay in the first place, may have
initially seemed questionable for a number of reasons. And before I offer my own reasons
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for holding to the belief that it was, in fact, ultimately a valuable scholarly undertaking, and
before I summarize what I feel was gained from doing so, I feel it would be constructive to
first examine the possible objections that one might raise against such a pursuit. For as I
mentioned in the last chapter (V), even Schlegel, soon after the publication of his
Aristophanes-essay in 1794, had already begun to change his views about the nature of
comedy to the extent that they contradicted the Aristophanes-essay.
If one looks at contemporary theories of comedy, one finds that the sort of question that
Schlegel seeks to answer, namely the question as to what constitutes the true essence of comedy,
is today seldom thought to yield the most fruitful results. For example, Robert Hume, in an
overview of the state of comedic theory (1972) published in the Journal of Aesthetics and Art
Criticism, writes that theories of comedy in the preceding three decades could be grouped into
two general categories: those that, from a psychological standpoint, tried to “‘explain’ comedy in
terms of human response to the comic”, and those that, from a formalistic standpoint, sought to
analyze canonical comedic works in an attempt to explain comedy’s formal attributes (Hume
87). Ruth Nevo, writing a decade earlier (1963), expressed a similar sentiment, claiming that the
field was best thought of as two separate disciplines: the “theory of comedy” and the “theory of
laughter” (Nevo 327).

And although Schlegel’s theory does in part concern itself with a

psychological understanding of the comical, he came, as we have seen, to the unique conclusion
that it has nothing to do with laughter essentially, but rather with joy.
A perusal of more recent publications on the theory and criticism of comedy reveals that
today, theorists in comedy must deal with a radically different comedic terrain than the one
Schlegel was familiar with, one that includes stand-up, sketch comedy, sitcoms, film comedy,
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cartoons etc. And the technological media by which comedies are transmitted have drastically
changed96. Theatrical comedy today exists at the fringes, and unlike in Aristophanes’ time – and
this is central to Schlegel’s theory –, it is not enjoyed by a general populace but rather by a
cultured elite. Schlegel’s theory, on the other hand, presupposes a dramatic institution wherein
theatrical comedy has widespread appeal and functions as a communal activity. Thus one might
offer that even if Schlegel’s theory may have once been thought to be applicable as a theory of
comedy, it no longer finds a comfortable home within the contemporary terrain of comedic
theories.
Despite, however, any reservations that one might have against extracting from
Schlegel’s essay an independent self-supporting theory of comedy, I nevertheless believe that in
doing so, I was able to highlight some of the more novel and interesting aspects – as yet un- or
underemphasized – of Schlegel’s theory. I would argue that some of these insights can, and in
some cases already have, found a home in comedic theory as it stands today. I will briefly list
these and then discuss them in more depth below:

1. Comedy and the Historical Method: The first aspect relates to Schlegel’s beliefs about
the peculiarity of comedy as opposed to other literary genres and to the historical method
which he believes might thus be applied to it. Comedy is different from other literary
genres not only in form and content, but as I discussed in Chapter IV.5, also in the public
to which it addresses itself.

According to Schlegel, comedy’s content must reflect

contemporary tastes, or else it falls on flat ears. Further, as I showed, Schlegel believes
96

See, for example, James Evans’ Comedy: an Annotated Bibliography of Theory and Criticism (1987).
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that comedy tends, more so than tragedy, to appeal to the most common or mainstream
tastes in a given society.

On account of this unique quality, comedy is also more

dependent than other genres on social tastes, and consequently, Schlegel believes that one
might study the social conditions necessary for producing the type of comedy that one
sees as being ideal.

2. Schlegel’s Notion of a ‘Comedy of Freude’: The second aspect relates to Schlegel’s
peculiar normative anthropological-psychological conclusion as to the essence of
comedy, namely, that pure comedy is comedy that aids in the realization of Freude in
those who experience it. This was the subject of Chapter IV.1.

3. Schlegel’s Emphasis on Freedom of Expression: Lastly, Schlegel’s emphasis on
external freedom yields a startling conclusion, namely, that comedy’s realization, as
Schlegel see it, is absolutely dependent on a society’s protection of artistic freedom of
expression. This was discussed in Chapter IV.3.

Comedy and the Historical Method
As I discussed in Chapter III, Schlegel’s theory of comedy was one of the first in Germany that
was not at all interested in content, structure, characters, in short, the art of dramatic storytelling
or of inducing laughter, but rather in why certain societies produced the comedies that they did.
For him, the relevant dichotomy was not author/audience, but rather artwork/society. He wished
to develop a normative theory of comedy that still remained true to a historical approach, and
though not often acknowledged, Schlegel’s essay on Aristophanes – and the theoretical method it
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utilizes – influenced to some degree comedic theories in the 19th century. The influence of
Schlegel’s essay is acknowledged in part by Profitlich, when he claims that the Schlegel brothers
were responsible for initiating the popularity that Aristophanes enjoyed during the 19th century
(Profitlich Komödientheorie 88).

However, Norbert Altenhofer’s collection of theories of

comedy from the second half of the 19th century shows that many theorists during this time
period took, at least indirectly, much more from Schlegel than simply his enthusiasm for
Aristophanes97. For example, Karl Hillebrand’s theory of what he terms ‘classical’ comedy
(1873), and the methodology that underlies it, bears uncanny resemblance with Schlegel’s98, and
though an in depth comparison of both theories lies outside the scope of this conclusion, I would
nevertheless like to address some of the strongest parallels between the two because Hillebrand’s
study can – from the perspective of the method it utilizes – be read as a more realized version of
Schlegel’s own historical-aesthetic approach, and thus discussing it might help clarify what is of
value in Schlegel’s method. The title of Hillebrand’s work – Die klassische Komödie und ihre
Voraussetzungen – already gives an indication that Hillebrand, like Schlegel, is interested in an
ideal (for Schlegel the pure, and for Hillebrand the classical comedy) and moreover that one can
sensibly examine the prerequisites that make that ideal realizable99. He asks the same essential
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Interestingly, in his Nachwort, Altenhofer nowhere mentions Schlegel’s influence. In addressing the admiration
for Aristophanes that these authors all share, Altenhofer makes the peculiar claim that only Hegel, among the
German Idealists, recognized Aristophanes’ greatness: “Nur Hegel hat den ernsthaften Versuch unternommen,
diesem Autor [Aristophanes, MB] seinen gebührenden Platz einzuräumen” (Altenhofer 216). It hardly needs to be
stated that F. Schlegel’s Aristophanes-essay makes this claim untrue.
98
In fact, the only real dissimilarity between the two in their approaches is that Hillebrand is not interested in the
anthropological properties that drive humans to create and experience comedies.
99
In fact the titles that Hillebrand gives his individual chapters read like a condensed summary of Schlegel’s
argumentative approach in the Aristophanes-essay: Vom Einfluß äußerer Umstände auf die verschiedene
Dichtungsarten, insbesondere auf die Komödie; Vom inneren Zusammenhang zwischen Tragödie und Komödie; Von
den nationalen Blütezeiten der klassischen Komödie und deren politisch-sozialen Voraussetzungen; Vom Zustand
der Sitten und der Literatur in diesen Blütezeiten; Von den Faktoren, die einer Entwicklung der Komödie in
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question as Schlegel: What does it take for societies to produce good comedies (good being
defined respectively by each author)? And like Schlegel, he believes that comedy and its
aesthetic worth, more so than other literary genres, is dependent on societal circumstances.

Nirgends scheint mir der Eingluß der Zeitumstände und der sozialen Verhältnisse
stärker wirksam zu sein als in der Komödie […]. Die Komödie wendet sich
unmittelbarer als jede andere Dichtungsart an die Masse des Publikums, an jene
Majorität also, in der sich die Auffassungen und der Geist einer Epoche verkörpern
(Altenhofer 31).

Like Schlegel, Hillebrand draws the logical implication that one thus arrives at the best
understanding of what makes Classical ages of comedy possible, by examining the social,
political and cultural conditions out of which Classical comedies arise. He proceeds then to
outline the various societal prerequisites he sees as being necessary. First, Classical comedy
requires “das Bestehen eines wirklichen Volkslebens”, which he alternately calls “d[as]
öffentliche Leben” (Altenhofer 66)100. And second, from the standpoint of Bildung, it requires
that the respective nation exhibit “eine fortgeschrittene Entwicklung des Denkens, das Fehlen
literarischer und sittlicher Verfallserscheinungen, schließlich Popularität und nationale
Verwurzelung des Theaters” (Altenhofer 85). The parallels between Schlegel and Hillebrand are
too apparent to ignore. Hillebrand, like Schlegel, sees in comedy a unique art form whose
aesthetic worth depends on sociological conditions. It is a distinct peculiarity of Schlegel’s
theory, and I have sought to emphasize this fact, that for him, society and comedy exist in a

Frankreich günstig sind; Von den Faktoren, die einer Entwicklung der Komödie in Frankreich ungünstig sind;
Versuch einer Prognose über die künftige Form der klassischen Komödie in Frankreich (Altenhofer ix.).
100

Interestingly, Hillebrand writes: “Der Geist der Öffentlichkeit ist de facto etwas ganz anderes als die öffentliche
Freiheit: Ein wirkliches Volksleben ist keineswegs identisch mit der Volkssouveränität” (Altenhofer 66)
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unique dialectic, and one can better understand a society by studying its comedies, but more
importantly, one can better understand the preconditions for certain types of comedies by
studying their societal context. This insight of Schlegel’s is so provocative because it implies
that comedy as a literary genre, on account of its character, lends itself to a particular
methodological approach, namely the historical.

Schlegel’s Notion of a ‘Comedy of Freude’
One of the more peculiar and perhaps confusing aspects of Schlegel’s theory is that he so
strongly advocates joy as being the central drive behind ‘true’ comedy. Thus though he, like
many theorizers of comedy, begins from a psychological (Schlegel would have thought of it as
an anthropological) premise, his theory does not concern itself with the comedic affect or the
mechanism behind the inducement of laughter. In fact, it is one of the most unique aspects of
Schlegel’s theory that it develops from a psychological premise and that it nevertheless makes no
mention of the psychological mechanism that is traditionally thought of as most characteristic of
comedy, namely laughter. Furthermore Freude is, as we have seen, conceived by Schlegel as an
emotion that unifies individuals and transcends boundaries: “Nur der Schmerz trennt und
vereinzelt; in der Freude verlieren sich alle Gränzen” (KAI 22). Whereas laughter is so often
thought of as arising out of divisions, discord, or contrast: “Erscheint das Lachen selbst als ein
Ausdruck der Freude, so wird der Gegenstand des Lachens statt dessen zumeist in Kategorien
der Negativität gekennzeichnet” (Reallexikon Komik 289). Freude is, for Schlegel, an emotion
that arises out of a certain affirmation of human existence. It is, he says, “[ein Produkt] reine[r]
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menschliche[r] Kraft” (KAI 21), and he sees it as being best represented in Greek comedy not on
account of Aristophanes’ plays themselves; these are, after all, very often satirical. Rather the
Greeks best realized Freude in comedy because of the particular society and comedic institutions
they had developed.

For Schlegel, Freude was the natural expression of their comedic

festivities, which – unlike tragedy – granted all members of society the potential for participation
in the comedic act.

“Das Athenische Volk”, writes Schlegel, “erblickte […] seine eigne

Heiligkeit […] in der Schönheit eines Spiels” (KAI 24).

In fact, Schlegel’s understanding of

Freude seems not unlike that of Henri Bergson’s, who sees joy, in opposition to mere pleasure,
as being an affirmative expression of man’s creative faculties:

Le plaisir n'est qu'un artifice imaginé par la nature pour obtenir de l'être vivant la
conservation de la vie ; il n'indique pas la direction où la vie est lancée. Mais la joie
annonce toujours que la vie a réussi, qu'elle a gagné du terrain, qu'elle a remporté une
victoire : toute grande joie a un accent triomphal. Or, si nous tenons compte de cette
indication et si nous suivons cette nouvelle ligne de faits, nous trouvons que partout où
il y a joie, il y a création : plus riche est la création, plus profonde est la joie (Bergson
34).

Bergson wrote this around a hundred years after Schlegel’s death (1930), but the
formulation seems nevertheless to get at the same affirmative understanding of joy by perceiving
it as something that results not from the removal of obstacles but from the act of creation.
Furthermore, the implied dichotomy in Schlegel’s theory between “Joyous Comedy” and
“Derisive Comedy”, which I alluded to in Chapter IV.5 is, I think, quite interesting as a system
of classification. In fact, one might divorce from Schlegel’s theory of comedy its normative
overtones and say that instead of positing a ‘true’ form of comedy, he advocates a specific type
of comedy – namely, comedy of joy. Joyous comedy is unreflective, effusive, and optimistic;
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derisive comedy, on the other hand, is reflective, critical, pessimistic. It arises, as Schlegel says,
out of a “Lust am Schlechten” (KAI 31). Comedy that depicts “das Lächerliche” (ibid.) – as
opposed to “reine Freude” (KAI 20) – is only natural in a society, as Schlegel sees it, where
individuals can take pleasure in laughing at the folly of others. “[Den roheren Mensch, MB] kann
auch wohl das Komische eines leidenden oder schlechten Gegenstandes ergötzen. […] Aber
wenn der öffentliche Geschmack sich bildet, wenn der Verstand und die Reizbarkeit des
Publikums sich verfeinern, so wird es die Werke, die es ehedem schön fand, beleidigend finden”
(KAI 27). The societal requirement for joyous comedy is a refined of public taste. As I
discussed in Chapter IV.2, Schlegel unfortunately never gives a completely satisfying description
of what exactly a refined public taste would constitute. Nevertheless the distinction between
joyous and derisive comedy, and Schlegel’s attempt to link these comedic types to particular
societal conditions, is a provocative thought, and it might yield interesting results to look at
existing comedies according to this dichotomy and to try to see whether or not there is any
credence to the belief that they are indicative at all of particular common societal values,
preoccupations, and conventions. Can, one might ask, anything be said of a society that tends
towards the satirical or towards the joyous in its comedy?

Schlegel’s Emphasis on Freedom of Expression
Lastly, one of the most interesting aspects of Schlegel’s theory is, as I showed in Chapter IV.3,
that it takes the protection of artistic freedom to be an aesthetic necessity. More than simply
pointing out that comedy flourishes in an open society, Schlegel maintains that an open society is
an essential precondition for anything that wishes to call itself comedy, and for him this means
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that it is an essential precondition for any comedy that hopes to have any aesthetic worth.
Whether this is true or not is another matter, and probably many people would argue that
ultimately, it is not. But the theory at least deserves acknowledgement as one of the first
defenses of artistic freedom of expression. And there does in fact seem to be some credence to
the belief, for example, that in modern society, comedy tends to be censured more often than
other types of literature. Leonard Freedman, in his study of satire in both democratic and
authoritarian regimes, comes to the – perhaps intuitively obvious, though nevertheless important
– conclusion that “there is considerably more satire in democratic than in authoritarian regimes”
(Freedman ix). Whether or not censorship affects comedy’s aesthetic worth, it inevitably affects
its content101.
Interestingly, though Schlegel perhaps could not have anticipated it, many nations did in
fact move, over the following century, towards full freedom of speech. And furthermore, it is
only after a considerable amount of freedom was allowed to artistic expression that comedy
returned to anything like the explicit satire that one sees in Aristophanes. One is hard-pressed,
for example, to find the extreme mockery of public figures in drama that one finds in
Aristophanes, unless one looks in modern literature.

Of course true external freedom, as

Schlegel sees it, has not been fully realized. This is because external freedom cannot exist solely
through political protection. External freedom for Schlegel, as we have seen, means that a
society grants full freedom to art, and in modern societies, we often observe that though

101

Freedman indicates that there is no reason to believe that political censorship actually affects the aesthetic worth
of comedy when he write that “Soviet satirist, even before Stalin clamped down on their efforts, worked within
severe constraints. It could well be that these very constraints explain the high quality and intensity of much satire
under authoritarian regimes, which provoked a deep indignation against profound injustice and required the
ingenuity and subtlety need[ed] to outwit censors” (Freedman 5).
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government censorship has been largely abolished, the force of political correctness is
nevertheless strong enough to bend comedic output to its standards. In this sense, it could be
argued that political correctness acts as a sort of societally based censorship. Furthermore, the
robust culture of satire, which has persisted in comedy to the present day, seems to indicate that,
as Schlegel sees it, we are still far from realizing what Schlegel saw as internal freedom on a
large scale. In fact, it is doubtful whether Schlegel believed that what he saw as ‘true’ comedy
could be achieved in anything less than a utopia, and I believe it is not a stretch to say that
Schlegel’s theory, in so far as it grounds a comedic ideal in a societal ideal, constitutes an
example of utopian thought. As I discussed in Chapter V., Schlegel seems to indicate that
comedy’s aesthetic worth might be promoted in a community with a democratic political
structure, but its absolute perfection, as he sees it, must be reserved for a society that has realized
both internal and external freedom to the point that it has no need for the political protection of
free expression, or unsatisfactory approximations of the communal will, such as democracy
provides. As I showed in Chapter IV.5, though other genres might exist in idealized forms in
imperfect societies, according to Schlegel, not the comedy. Schlegel is adamant about this point
and some scholars, specifically Brummack and Oesterle, have emphasized that Schlegel is
necessarily implying a utopian home for comedy. “Ist das tragisch bzw. erhaben Schöne in
Zukunft [und Vergangenheit] realisierbar”, writes Oesterle, “so rückt die Verwirklichung des
komisch Schönen unter Bedingungen künstlicher Bildung in utopische Ferne” (Oesterle 445).
And, in fact, Schlegel seems to express doubt as to whether pure comedy will be realizable when
he writes:
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Sie [die Komödie, MB] wird es [das höchste Schöne, MB] erreichen, wenn die Absicht
vielleicht in einer späten Zukunft ihr Geschäft vollendet und mit Natur endigt, wenn
aus Gesetzmäßigkeit Freiheit wird, wenn die Würde und die Freiheit der Kunst ohne
Schutz sicher, wenn jede Kraft des Menschen frei und jeder Mißbrauch der Freiheit
unmögliche sein wird (KAI 29).

This passage from the Aristophanes-essay seems to imply that in such a future society, there
would be no need for political protection. The freedom required of art would be self-evident to
all. And society would become a sort of Bildungsutopie, rendering governmental force
unnecessary. It is one of the results of this study, that it is this utopian undercurrent in Schlegel’s
theory, which ultimately goes furthest in keeping it from being applicable as a system for the
interpretation of comedy, and which draws an inextricable link between an aesthetic system on
the one hand, and a normative social prerequisite on the other.
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Schlegel Texts Used in this Study:

Publications and Notebooks (in chronological order)
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Von den Schulen der griechischen Poesie (1794) KAI, 3-18.
Vom ästhetischen Werte der griechischen Komödie (1794) KAI, 19-33.
Über das Studium der Griechischen Poesie (1795-97) KAI, 217-367.
Vom Wert des Studiums der Griechen und Römer (1795) KAI, 621-642.
Geschichte der Poesie der Griechen und Römer (1798) KAI, 395-568.
Lyceum-Fragment 115 (1797) KAII, 161.
Athenäum-Fragment 116 (1798) KAII, 182f.
Athenäum-Fragment 216 (1798) KAII, 198f.
Rezension: Herders Briefe zur Beförderung der Humanität (1796) KAII, 47-56.
Ankündigung der geplanten Übersetzung des Platon (1800) KAIII, 334.
“Vorrede”: Ansichten und Ideen von der christlichen Kunst (1823) KAIV, 3-5.
Von der Schönheit in der Dichtkunst (1795/96) KAXVI, 3-32.
Philosophie des Lebens: In fünfzehn Vorlesungen gehalten zu Wien im Jahre 1827 (1827)
KAX, 1-288.
“Charakteristik der Dorier” Von den Zeitaltern, Schulen und Stilen der greich. Poesie
(1795) KAXI, 227-248.
Versuch über den Begriff des Republikanismus (1796) KAVII, 11-25.

Letters (in chronological order)
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Friedrich Schlegel an August Wilhelm Schlegel: Leipzig, 2. Juni 1793 KAXXIII, 99-102.
Friedrich Schlegel an August Wilhelm Schlegel: Leipzig, 28. August 1793 KAXXIII,
123-130.
Friedrich Schlegel an August Wilhelm Schlegel: Leipzig, 16. Oktober 1793 KAXXIII,
139-144.
Friedrich Schlegel an August Wilhelm Schlegel: Leipzig, 11. Dezember 1793 KAXXIII,
162-168.
Friedrich Schlegel an August Wilhelm Schlegel: Dresden, 5. April 1794 KAXXIII, 187189.
Friedrich Schlegel an August Wilhelm Schlegel: Dresden, 27. Oktober 1794 KAXXIII,
208-210.
Friedrich Schlegel an August Wilhelm Schlegel: Pillnitz, 4. Juli 1795 KAXXIII, 236-239.
Friedrich Schlegel an August Wilhelm Schlegel: Dresden, 19. Januar 1796 KAXXIII,
274-277.
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